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Reviewing Administrative Review 
David K. Hausman† 
In the largest system of federal adjudication—Social Security 
disability adjudication—outcomes depend more on the randomly assigned 
judge than on the strength of the case. Does the administrative appeals 
process use resources effectively to reduce that arbitrariness and limit the 
discretion of administrative law judges? If not, how and why does it fail? 
These are empirical questions, and this Article uses a new dataset tracking 
millions of cases to answer them. 
A system of administrative appeals that efficiently limits the 
discretion of decisionmakers should display three empirical patterns. First, 
disappointed claimants should be more likely to appeal the decisions of 
harsher judges—judges who have lower grant rates than their colleagues 
in the same hearing office (claim selection). Second, when claimants 
appeal, harsher judges’ decisions should be reversed more often than the 
decisions of their more generous colleagues (decisionmaking). Third, 
judges should try to avoid remands and therefore increase their grant rates 
after a reversal (remand aversion). 
Testing for each of these patterns offers a method of diagnosing 
problems with systems of administrative review—and helps identify where 
new resources would be most useful. For example, if litigants rarely appeal 
decisions of even extreme adjudicators, a quality assurance process might 
solve the problem by randomly selecting cases for review. If appellate 
decisionmaking itself is flawed, peer review may be more promising. And 
if adjudicators are insensitive to remands, training and feedback might be 
appropriate. 
I apply this method to conduct the first quantitative study of 
administrative appeals in Social Security disability adjudications. I use a 
previously unreleased database, obtained by Freedom of Information Act 
request, of nearly four million Social Security Administrative Law Judge 
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and Appeals Council decisions from 2010 to 2014. Social Security Appeals 
Council decisions do not show the expected decisionmaking pattern: on 
average, the Appeals Council fails to distinguish between the decisions of 
harsher and more generous adjudicators. That finding helps explain why 
litigants complain that Appeals Council decisions are unpredictable, and 
the finding leads to a diagnosis: the Appeals Council is both too 
deferential, because it is unable to conduct holistic factual review, and not 
deferential enough, because it must reverse decisions for harmless errors. 
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Introduction 
Why do courts and agencies invest in an appeals process instead of 
dedicating the same resources to improving initial decisions? There are 
several possible reasons: that litigants appeal the cases more likely to 
contain errors, allowing the appeals court to review a smaller number of 
cases;1 that the appeals process allows a second decisionmaker to review 
 
1. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.L. 
STUD. 379 (1995). 
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the work of the first, limiting the discretion of the first decisionmaker and 
making extreme decisions less likely; and that the appeals process 
improves the decisions of the initial decisionmaker, who issues rulings in 
its shadow. But do appeals in fact create these efficiencies? 
This Article makes two contributions. First, it proposes a theory of 
administrative review that offers a new way of understanding the steps at 
which such review can limit the discretion of line-level decisionmakers. 
Second, it applies that theory to the Social Security disability appeals 
process, using an internal administrative dataset to identify the system’s 
strengths and weaknesses. 
In the theory, I posit that discretion-limiting systems of review share 
three empirical features. First, litigants choose whether to appeal (claim 
selection). Litigants appeal more often from harsher decisions—decisions 
that they believe are more likely to be reversed on appeal. Second, the 
appeal reaches appellate decisionmakers, who disproportionately reverse 
harsher decisions (decisionmaking). Third, when a remand is handed 
down, it returns to the original judge, and the theory predicts that such 
remands lead judges to alter their behavior in the short term, making their 
decisions more closely match those of their colleagues (remand aversion). 
To test empirically whether the Social Security Appeals Council limits 
discretion at these three steps, I take advantage of close-to-random 
assignment of cases to administrative law judges (ALJs) within the same 
hearing office. First, I find that litigants do select cases from harsher ALJs 
for appeal. The claim-selection process therefore works mostly as 
designed. Second, I find that a rule granting automatic full review of claims 
challenging dismissals leads to more reversals of more generous ALJs—
the opposite of the expected pattern. Third, I find that ALJs barely change 
their behavior in the aftermath of remands, if at all. 
The main results in this Article are causal, exploiting the near-random 
assignment of cases to ALJs. These results diagnose where the Social 
Security appeals system is not effective. Interviews with ALJs then point 
the way to a cure. The appellate decisions of the Social Security Appeals 
Council themselves fail to promote consistency, not because the Appeals 
Council is ineffective, but likely because it defers both too little and too 
much. The Appeals Council often defers to factual determinations that 
would benefit from review, yet it also often reverses for harmless technical 
errors. 
The theory and results have broad implications. Scholars have long 
bemoaned dysfunction in mass adjudication. In the Executive Office for 
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Immigration Review,2 the Patent and Trademark Office,3 the National 
Labor Relations Board,4 the Securities and Exchange Commission,5 the 
Veterans Benefits Administration,6 and many other state and federal 
health, safety and environmental agencies, advocates and scholars have 
found that uncontrolled discretion and inconsistent decisionmaking stand 
in the way of fair and efficient adjudication.7 
Yet the systematic study of dysfunction in adjudication has often 
faced two roadblocks. First, data are scarce. This Article solves that 
problem with new internal Social Security data, obtained by Freedom of 
Information Act request, tracking millions of Social Security disability 
adjudications. Second, even when datasets are available, causal inference 
may be impossible. This Article solves that problem by exploiting the near-
random assignment of cases to administrative law judges. That near-
random assignment means that we can attribute differences in grant rates 
within the same hearing offices to the judges themselves, rather than to 
differences in their caseloads. 
The Article’s theory and results also offer a new way to compare the 
success of appeals processes across administrative domains, and in Part IV 
of this Article, I explain how this Article’s theory can improve our 
understanding of patent and immigration adjudications. In the patent 
context, I argue that distinguishing between the selection and 
decisionmaking steps of review could help advance our understanding. 
And in the immigration context, I explain how this new theory led me to 
 
2. See generally JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. 
SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM (2009); David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1177 (2016) (confirming that disparities across immigration judges do not only reflect case 
assignment and tracking those disparities on appeal); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 
(2007). 
3. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 151, 170-75 (2004) (discussing the consequences of disparities in the grant rates of patent 
examiners). 
4. See, e.g., Cole D. Taratoot & Robert M. Howard, The Labor of Judging: Examining 
Administrative Law Judge Decisions, 39 AM. POL. RES. 832, 844-47 (2011) (finding that ALJs 
exercise considerable discretion, and that the exercise of that discretion reflects their political 
ideology). 
5. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1185-86 
(finding no statistically significant differences in government win rates across ALJs, but noting the 
extremely high win rate for the government overall). 
6. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT 
NO. 05-00765-137, REVIEW OF STATE VARIANCES IN VA DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
PAYMENTS (2005) (documenting cross-state inconsistencies in veterans’ disability awards). 
7. For a long and useful list of areas of administrative adjudication in which inconsistency 
across adjudicators is a central problem, see Daniel E. Ho, An Experiment of Experimentalism, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (2017); and Daniel E. Ho & Sam Sherman, Managing Street-Level 
Arbitrariness: The Evidence Base for Public Sector Quality Improvement, 13 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 251, 264-65 (2017). 
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add to a previous Article on immigration appeals, investigating whether 
immigration judges change their behavior to avoid remands. 
Together, the results and comparisons yield a method of evaluating 
three prominent proposals for the reform of mass adjudication. First, Jerry 
Mashaw has advocated the adoption of quality assurance systems to 
protect claimants’ due process rights; such systems, by randomly selecting 
cases for additional review, mostly alter the first stage of review, taking the 
case selection process out of claimants’ hands. Quality assurance proposals 
are therefore most obviously needed if the first stage of review—litigant 
selection—is ineffective. Second, democratic experimentalists have 
advocated peer review—in which at least a subset of initial decisions 
happen in teams or receive review by a peer—as a mechanism for 
enhancing accuracy and consistency in adjudications. These proposals 
target the decisionmaking process itself (the second stage) and are most 
needed when that stage is flawed. Third, many scholars have suggested 
expanding adversarial due process protections in the tradition of Mathews 
v. Eldridge8 and Goldberg v. Kelly.9 These proposals would make agency 
adjudications more court-like—for example, by establishing other Article 
I courts modeled on the Tax Court or improving access to lawyers. Such 
proposals aim to strengthen adversarial review rather than to augment or 
replace it; such proposals are most persuasive where they can plausibly 
assert that the changes would improve the claimant-selection process. 
Quality assurance, peer review, and adversarial due process 
protections all require resources to implement. Although I do not address 
the budgetary considerations that would necessarily inform the details of 
implementation, I offer a framework for deciding which of these systems 
of review is the best use of scarce resources. For disability adjudications, 
the results here suggest that the selection stage—at which claimants decide 
whether to appeal—functions reasonably well, although it could be 
improved by allowing the government to choose cases to contest on appeal. 
At the decisionmaking stage, by contrast, the Social Security Appeals 
Council has too limited a mandate to promote consistency in outcomes; I 
therefore propose expanding that mandate. 
I. Constraining Administrative Discretion 
A. Why Review 
The problem of unconstrained discretion in administrative 
adjudication has been studied for decades, with evidence from nearly every 
 
8. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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large area of adjudication.10 Such studies have also produced proposals for 
reform, which, in their most general form, usually call for some type of 
review—some system whereby the line-level adjudicator’s decision 
receives a second look from another official. Such proposals fall into three 
broad categories. First, administrative-law scholars—most prominently, 
Jerry Mashaw—have argued that internal management devices, such as 
quality assurance systems, are at least as important to accurate and fair 
adjudication as adversarial due process protections.11 Second, many 
scholars have proposed some version of peer review to make decisions 
more consistent.12 Finally, some scholars have argued, especially in the 
immigration context, for strengthening adversarial procedural protections 
in administrative adjudications, or for moving such adjudications to the 
Article III courts or to a specialized Article I court.13 
 
10. Limiting adjudicators’ discretion and thereby promoting consistency (or uniformity 
or predictability) is a near-universal stated goal of administrative adjudication. In the Social 
Security context, see, for example, Judge Patricia Jonas, Exec. Dir., Office of Appellate 
Operations, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, Soc. Sec. Admin., Statement Before 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (Sept. 13, 2012), 
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_091312.html [https://perma.cc/2WNK-FE8A] (noting 
that “[o]ver the past five years, the allowance and denial rates have become more consistent 
throughout the ALJ corps.”); see also EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/02/04/practice_manual_-_02-08-
2016_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9EG-4MP9] (noting “the public’s desire for greater 
uniformity in Immigration Court procedures”). Appeals for consistency and uniformity in systems 
of decisionmaking come not only from policymakers but also from scholars like Jerry Mashaw, 
who suggests that rational systems of adjudication should be neither completely mechanical nor 
completely discretionary: “We want discretion to be constrained by programmatically specified 
values and a perception of true states of the world.” JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC 
JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 72 (1983). The history of Social 
Security disability adjudications in particular is a history of repeated and often failing attempts to 
decrease inconsistency across ALJs. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an 
Administrative Law Context: The Dejà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 475, 490-95 (2007). 
11. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social 
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775-76, 822-23 (1974). I know of only one convincing 
quantitative test of the efficacy of a system of quality assurance. See Daniel E, Ho, Cassandra Handan-
Nader, David Ames & David Marcus, Quality Review of Mass Adjudication: A Randomized Natural 
Experiment at the Board of Veterans Appeals, 2003-2016, 35 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 239 (2019); see also 
David Ames, Cassandra Handan-Nader, Daniel E. Ho & David Marcus, Due Process and Mass 
Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48-51 (2020). 
12. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 7, at 1; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism 
and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 79-80 (2011) (noting 
decentralization and feedback between employees and superiors as hallmarks of an 
experimentalist administration); see generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution 
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).  
13. See, e.g., Stacey Caplow, Peter L. Markowitz, Jojo Annobil, Peter Z. Cobb & Nancy 
Morawetz, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 
New York Immigrant Representation Study Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 384 (2011) 
(comparing relief rates for immigrants with and without lawyers and advocating for funding for 
lawyers); Access to Justice for Immigrant Families and Communities: Study of Legal Representation 
of Detained Immigrants in Northern California, NORTHERN CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR 
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This Article proposes a quantitative method of diagnosing the 
problems with existing systems of hierarchical, adversarial review. It also 
articulates a theory that clarifies the relationship between such traditional 
review and proposed innovations (quality assurance and peer review in 
particular). The hallmarks of a hierarchical, adversarial system of review 
are simple: a person who receives an unfavorable decision has the option 
to have the decision reviewed and potentially reversed by a higher 
authority. Even many administrative decisionmaking systems that lack the 
words “appeal” or “review” resemble hierarchical, adversarial review. 
Consider grievances filed by prisoners against guards14 or complaints filed 
against police officers.15 
Since some parts of a review system may work well while others are 
dysfunctional, breaking the process into parts is a useful exercise. 
Hierarchical, adversarial review takes place in three basic steps, outlined 
below. This Article presents a method of diagnosing problems at each step. 
It also identifies which elements quality assurance and peer review share, 
or do not share, with the traditional model of review. Such diagnosis can 
help policymakers choose among possible proposed reforms.16 
 
IMMIGRANT J. 18 (Oct. 2014), http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/NCCIJ-Access-to-Justice-
Report-Oct.-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8GJ-8ZAT] (similar); John D. Montgomery, Cost of 
Counsel in Immigration: Economic Analysis of Proposal Providing Public Counsel to Indigent 
Persons Subject to Immigration Removal Proceedings, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 3 (May 28, 
2014), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/NERA_Immigration_Report_5.28.
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H72-UPEM] (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of government-
provided counsel for immigrants); see also Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress 
Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULL. 3 (2008); Policy 
Priorities, FED. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 21, 2021), http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Issues-Agendas.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ML5V-BJGA] (advocating the formation of an Article I immigration court). 
14. For a list of prisoner-grievance policies, see Prisoner and Jail Grievance Policies, U. 
MICH. L. SCH. (2021),  
https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/PrisonGrievanceProceduresandS
amples.aspx [https://perma.cc/L8PY-NTZU]. 
15. See, e.g., Complaint Process, DISTRICT COLUMBIA OFFICE POLICE COMPLAINTS, 
http://policecomplaints.dc.gov/page/complaint-process-opc [https://perma.cc/6FHM-Q3UL]. 
16. This Article’s goal is descriptive rather than normative, and it leaves to others the 
defense of the normative proposition that consistent application of rules to similar cases is 
desirable. But it is important to note that this Article’s empirical tests single out a particular type 
of consistency: consistency across judges and within hearing offices. The promotion, by 
administrative review, of that cross-judge, within-hearing-office consistency is not subject to two 
of the most prominent normative objections to uniformity as a due process value.  
The first inapplicable objection is that pursuing uniformity prevents judges from 
considering relevant differences between cases. For example, pursuing uniformity in grant rates 
across different regions might mean applying disuniform standards to reach the same results 
despite differences in cases. That objection is not relevant here, since I measure only uniformity 
across judges within the same court, for whom cases are randomly assigned—who face the same 
caseload. In other words, this Article is concerned with how often judges who evaluate the same 
caseload reach opposite conclusions. 
The second inapplicable objection is that bright-line rules—the most common method of 
promoting uniformity—impose high costs. A simple bright-line rule applied to all disability 
applicants—for example, one holding that only applicants with odd-numbered birth dates receive 
benefits—would be one way to make outcomes appear uniform across judges with the same 
 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:1059 2021 
1066 
B. A Simple Theory of Review 
The standard administrative mechanism for controlling adjudicators’ 
discretion is hierarchical, adversarial administrative review.17 By 
hierarchical, adversarial review, I mean a system allowing a disappointed 
claimant to appeal an adverse decision to an authority that has the power 
to reverse, remand, or affirm that decision. Such systems are ubiquitous in 
the administrative state and the courts, and legal scholars have offered 
theoretical accounts of their purposes and effects. I build on these accounts 
to offer a simple theory of administrative review as a device for limiting 
discretion in decisionmaking. 
Any system that allows a second decisionmaker to review the work of 
a first decisionmaker includes at least three stages.18 First, some set of 
decisions is selected for review. Second, review takes place. Third, if an 
error is discovered, some sort of consequence, such as a remand, follows 
for the original decisionmaker. 
In a system of hierarchical, adversarial review, these three stages 
occur in a distinctive way. First, the losing party chooses whether or not to 
appeal, and that choice determines which cases receive review (litigant 
selection). Second, the appellate body reviews appealed decisions for legal 
or factual error, with varying degrees of deference (decisionmaking). 
Third, the appellate body affirms, reverses, or remands the initial decision; 
upon remand, the case usually returns to the same initial decisionmaker, 
who is unlikely to greet the remand with pleasure (remand aversion). 
Thinking of the process in these three simple steps generates 
expectations about the results. To develop these expectations, I draw on 
Steven Shavell’s influential model of appeal as a means of error 
 
caseload. No one would advocate that. Yet the rule/standard tradeoff is not at issue in evaluating 
the effect of review on cross-judge, within-hearing-office consistency.  
Reduction of cross-judge, within-hearing-office disparity on review is not evidence of 
bright-line rule application that raises concerns about the costs of uniformity. To see this, consider 
an example: if the reviewing body were to reverse all even-numbered-birthday cases, harsher and 
more lenient judges would be equally likely to be reversed. In other words, application of a bright-
line rule by a reviewing court would reduce disparities only with respect to judges’ systematically 
differing application of that rule. A reduction in disparities after review is therefore not in itself 
evidence that the reviewing court is preventing judges from making decisions sensitive to 
individual facts. More relevant for my purposes, the lack of a reduction in cross-judge disparities 
hardly suggests that the appeals court is applying an individualized fact-sensitive test—though it 
may imply that the appeals court defers substantially to the trial judge’s initial determinations.  
17. Of course, there are other promising proposals for promoting consistency, including 
quality assurance systems, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, and peer review, see Ho & 
Sherman, supra note 7, at 255, 258, 265. 
18. Review by a second decisionmaker is far from the only possible method of limiting 
adjudicators’ discretion, but such review is the topic here. For an extremely useful typology of a 
broader range of methods of limiting adjudicators’ discretion, see Ho & Sherman, supra note 7, at 
254. 
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correction,19 but I tweak the assumptions, leading to different 
implications.20 Most important, I assume that litigants have imperfect 
information about whether the decision in their case was extreme.21 
At the first stage of review, litigants select cases to appeal. In deciding 
whether to appeal, I assume that disappointed litigants have some 
knowledge of whether their cases have merit and, therefore, about whether 
the denial of benefits was unusual and likely to be reversed on appeal.22 
For claimants with lawyers, this knowledge may come from experience 
with other cases. Even claimants without lawyers may have some sense of 
whether a decision is extreme, however, partly because they know whether 
the decision matches their own view of their disability, and partly because 
they can observe the demeanor of their ALJ and may even know his or her 
allowance rate. Litigants, then, are more likely to appeal denials of 
meritorious claims and, therefore, to appeal from the decisions of harsh 
judges, who more often deny meritorious claims.23 
To make this idea concrete, consider Figure 1. In that simplified 
figure, decisions—both grants and denials—have a distribution of merit, 
and there are only two judges. Judge A, who is harsh, grants only the top 
25% of cases by merit (the cases in the light-grey region, to the right of the 
dashed line). Judge B, who is generous, grants the 75% of cases before her 
with the most merit (all decisions to the right of the dotted line). None of 
the top 25% of cases by merit are appealed, since none of those decisions 
are denials. For Judge A, appealable denials fall into either the dark-grey 
or the black sections of the figure—the bottom 75% of decisions by merit. 
For Judge B, by contrast, the only appealable denials are from the bottom 
quarter of decisions by merit.24 
 
19. Shavell, supra note 1. Shavell asks the question of why one might use an appeal 
process rather than investing the same resources in avoiding errors at trial. His theory answers this 
question with the simple insight that each litigant has knowledge about whether the trial court 
made an error in his or her case, and that this knowledge makes appeals more efficient because 
they need only decide cases that litigants have already identified as likely mistaken. 
20. Consistency across decisionmakers may partly proxy for accuracy—but only partly—
and I do not address other important purposes of administrative review, including its role in policy 
development and political accountability. For a more comprehensive account of the purposes of 
administrative review, see generally CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER & MATTHEW LEE WIENER, 
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., AGENCY APPELLATE SYSTEMS (2020). 
21. See infra fig.2 and accompanying text. 
22. This resembles Shavell’s assumption that litigants know whether an error was made 
in their case; I assume, similarly, that they know whether a decision was extreme. Note that the 
empirical tests later in this piece do not test whether judges who are outliers are more likely to be 
appealed and reversed, but rather whether the allowance rate of a judge is correlated with his or 
her rate of appeal and reversal. The assumption in this research design is that the incidence of 
extreme decisions tracks judges’ allowance rates. 
23. Because there is some cost of appeal, rational litigants do not appeal when they are 
unlikely to win reversal. 
24. I assume that there is some underlying distribution of merit in cases rather than that 
cases have one correct outcome. If one were to assume that cases had one correct outcome, then 
judges’ differing allowance rates would depend on how many of their denials and grants were 
mistaken. That model would yield similar predictions, but I prefer to imagine a distribution of 
merit among cases, with reasonable adjudicators disagreeing about some outcomes. 








Because I assume that litigants know how meritorious their cases are, 
and that litigants are more likely to appeal more meritorious cases, litigants 
are more likely to appeal denials of second and third quartile cases (dark 
grey in the figure) than denials of first quartile cases (black in the figure). 
Figure 2 shows the theoretical relationship between merit and the 
likelihood of appeal; the black dots (cases in the lower 25th percentile of 
the merit distribution) are less likely to be appealed than grey dots (cases 
between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the merit distribution). The middle 
two quartiles include denials only from Judge A. As a result, Judge A not 
only has more denials total, but a higher proportion of his or her denials is 
meritorious and likely to lead to an appeal. (There are no light-grey dots 
because there are no denials, and therefore no appeals, from the top 25% 
of the merit distribution.) The decisions of the harsher judge (Judge A) are 
more likely to be appealed. 
This is litigant selection, the first stage of adversarial, hierarchical 
review.  Litigant selection depends on litigants’ knowledge and decisions—
rather than, for example, random selection—to choose which cases to 
review. Litigant selection implies that claimants appeal more often after 




























Because litigants are more likely to appeal more meritorious cases, 
the appellate review body hears cases that have more merit than the 
average denial. But merit is not the only consideration that determines 
whether a litigant appeals, and the chance of appeal varies for any given 
level of merit. As a result, the appeals body must still distinguish among 
more meritorious and less meritorious cases. 
At the second stage of the appeals process, decisionmaking, I expect 
appellate adjudicators to reverse denials in meritorious cases more often 
than denials in less meritorious ones. Such adjudicators will therefore more 
often reverse the decisions of harsher judges, who more frequently deny 
meritorious claims. This follows from the relative weakness of my first 
assumption: litigants have only some knowledge of a decision’s merit, not 
perfect knowledge. Litigants, like adjudicators, make mistakes; they may 
believe their cases have merit when they do not, and vice versa. I also 
assume that adjudicators themselves have imperfect information and 
cannot fully anticipate whether their decisions will be appealed or 
reversed. Given this mix of decisions, I expect the appeals process to 
reverse denials in more meritorious cases more often than denials in less 
meritorious ones. Because, as explained above, the cases appealed from 
harsh judges should have more merit on average, those appeals should 
more frequently lead to reversal. 
Figure 3 shows this expected pattern graphically. Many of the dots 
from Figure 2 are no longer present because many cases were not 
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the black dots to result in reversals. Only Judge A has grey dots; Judge A 
is more likely than Judge B to be reversed on appeal. 
 
Figure 3: Merit and Reversal 
 
Third, I expect that judges seek to avoid remand. Unlike selection and 
decisionmaking effects, the effects of line-level judges’ efforts to avoid 
remand are largely invisible, since judges may not react to actual remands 
but rather anticipate possible remands. One implication of judges’ efforts 
to avoid remands is, however, observable: that judges try harder to avoid 
reversal soon after having experienced a remand. This expectation is 
grounded in two assumptions. First, I expect that, even if judges largely 
anticipate remands, they sometimes learn something unexpected, and that 
remands therefore influence their behavior in the short term, leading them 
to avoid the error that led to the remand. Second, I expect that judges 
overestimate the probability of remands when they have recently 
experienced them. Such overestimation reflects what cognitive 
psychologists call the availability heuristic.25 Examples of the availability 
heuristic are common: for example, “[m]any readers must have 
experienced the temporary rise in the subjective probability of an accident 
after seeing a car overturned by the side of the road.”26 This cognitive 
pattern implies that the effects of remands should be observable in the 
immediate aftermath of a remand. For Social Security claims, since 
 
25. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
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claimants initiate nearly all appeals, I expect judges to become slightly 
more generous, on average, after reversals. I call this effect remand 
aversion.27 
This simple three-stage theory offers a way of thinking about three 
prominent strains of policy prescriptions for systems of administrative 
review. It also gives rise to three hypotheses, which I describe and test in 
Part III below, taking advantage of the near-random assignment of cases 
to ALJs. 
C. Review Proposals 
In canvassing three categories of review proposals, I begin with Jerry 
Mashaw’s advocacy of quality assurance systems and other management 
reforms to protect due process rights in welfare-claims processes. In 1974, 
Mashaw famously argued that the procedural safeguards of adversarial due 
process are inadequate for the adjudication of social-welfare claims, partly 
because welfare claimants may not be able to take advantage of trial-like 
procedural safeguards.28 Mashaw therefore suggested a quality assurance 
system: a management system designed to ensure accuracy in adjudications 
without the trappings of adversarial litigation.29 
For illustration, here, drawn from Mashaw’s work, is a short 
description of one such system: the Veterans’ Pensions and Compensation 
disability program.30 In that program, a system of quality assurance 
 
27. Note that the first of the three steps in the theory requires litigants to know—albeit 
imprecisely—whether a decision reflected an extreme exercise of discretion, and to act on that 
knowledge, whereas the second and third effects depend on the imperfection of litigants’ and 
judges’ knowledge. I believe that both of these assumptions are realistic. Lawyers and claimants 
have some knowledge of the extremity of the decision in their case, but that knowledge is 
necessarily limited: some litigants are overconfident, some issues are close, and some lawyers 
misjudge even issues that are not close. Moreover, lawyers’ time and resources are limited, and 
they—like adjudicators—make errors. 
28. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and 
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social 
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775 (1974). 
29. Id. at 791. For another account of a quality assurance system in action, see Deborah 
A. Chassman & Howard Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A Case Study in Quality 
Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (1981) (describing the implementation of a 
quality-assurance system for disability adjudications). For a discussion of the problems facing 
attempts to implement quality-assurance systems in government, see James E. Swiss, Adapting 
Total Quality Management (TQM) to Government, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 356 (1992) (suggesting 
that total quality management—a system that was widely adopted in postwar manufacturing in 
Japan, and that more recently became influential in the United States—could be effective in 
government only with substantial modifications). 
30. I summarize Mashaw’s account of that system rather than describing it myself—or 
updating the particulars that may have changed in the four decades since Mashaw’s article—since 
my goal here is conceptual rather than empirical. On the issue of the inadequacy of adversarial 
procedures, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative 
Justice, 1981 DUKE. L.J. 181, 211-12 (1981) (suggesting that courts should consider nonadversarial 
procedures for protecting due process and decrying the false choice between “the legal chauvinism 
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supplemented an administrative appeals process. Each day, reviewers in 
regional offices considered a random sample of initial disability decisions, 
looking for procedural and substantive errors.31 They logged these errors 
in monthly reports sent to a national Office of Appraisal.32 The national 
office then conducted its own review of a random sample of cases and 
noted where its review did not match the findings of the regional office.33 
Finally, individual determinations of error were returned to the initial 
adjudicator, who was asked to agree or disagree with the appraisal of his 
or her error.34 
This quality assurance system was both similar to and different from 
a classic system of hierarchical, adversarial review. Instead of relying on 
disappointed claimants to generate appeals, the quality assurance system 
randomly selected cases for additional review. The second stage of the 
review process was similar to the appellate decisionmaking stage in 
hierarchical review: although the decisionmaker did not receive briefs from 
the parties, he or she did, like an Administrative Appeals Judge, evaluate 
the decision below for procedural and substantive error. Finally, the last 
stage, in which decisions were returned to the initial decisionmaker, 
resembled the remand stage in hierarchical, adversarial review, except that 
the decisionmaker was not asked to redo the case, but rather to register 
agreement or disagreement with the finding of error. 
In sum, the largest difference between quality assurance and 
adversarial, hierarchical review is in the selection of cases—the first step of 
the review process. Favoring a quality assurance system over more 
traditional review therefore usually depends on the view that the adversary 
selection process for appeals is inadequate. Mashaw recognizes this, and 
he notes that appeals decisions themselves could produce information 
about patterns in errors in decisionmaking, but he doubts that they do, 
because appeals adjudicators hear only individual cases and are unable to 
perceive larger patterns.35 His view is plausible; it relies on the assumption 
that litigants often do not select mistaken or extreme decisions for 
appellate review. If litigants do select such decisions consistently, then 
patterns in those cases will reach appellate decisionmakers, and those 
decisionmakers should be able to correct them. 
I share Mashaw’s view that selection problems trouble many systems 
of administrative review. Of course, even if quality assurance programs are 
able to address selection problems through the random selection of cases, 
 
of a ubiquitous demand for trial-type procedure and an unexamined deference to administrative 
or legislative choice of some alternative mode of decisionmaking”). 
31. Mashaw, supra note 28, at 794. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 795. 
35. Id. at 785. 
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they may not achieve their aims. In the most credible study to date, Daniel 
Ho and his coauthors find that a quality review program at the Board of 
Veterans Appeals, which randomly selected cases for review and potential 
feedback from a quality review team, did little to reduce numbers of 
appeals or reversals.36 
The effectiveness of claimant-driven selection is at least partly 
measurable. Below, I offer evidence that selection in Social Security 
appeals, although far from perfect, is functional at the ALJ level. For 
example, it functions much better than the analogous selection process in 
immigration appeals. Of course, quality assurance systems include features 
beyond random selection. For example, the Veterans’ Pensions and 
Compensation quality assurance system not only altered the selection of 
cases for appeal but also led to the creation of statistical reports on 
outcomes that were shared with regional offices. Absent a selection 
problem, however, such reports could also be compiled from decisions of 
a standard adversarial appellate body. Finally, perhaps a quality assurance 
system would apply a different standard of review, focusing less on 
procedure and more on substance. The results below suggest that such a 
change could be useful for disability appeals, but it need not be paired with 
random selection of cases for review. 
Peer-review proposals, unlike quality assurance proposals, squarely 
attempt to improve the decisionmaking process itself—the second stage of 
review.37 In fact, one way to understand peer review is as a form of quality 
assurance that more directly targets inconsistency in decisionmaking.38 
Rather than face review by an appellate body, adjudicators are paired (or 
placed in larger groups) and reach a decision together or provide each 
other feedback on decisions. Peer review may promote consistent 
decisionmaking through “the informal pressures of pride and shame,” and 
through a requirement that decisions “be explained and subjected to 
examination.”39 
As an example, consider the peer-review procedures for food safety 
inspectors recently instituted by the Public Health Department of Seattle 
and King County. These procedures offer an especially good example 
because of their randomized implementation; the resulting study has 
yielded the most persuasive empirical evidence to date that peer review 
makes decisionmaking more consistent.40 In that study, some of the 
 
36. Ames et al., supra note 11; Ho et al., supra note 11, at 252-58.  
37. For a discussion of experimentalist administration, see Sabel & Simon, supra note 13, 
at 78-93. One of Sabel and Simon’s examples combines elements of quality assurance and peer 
review: the Quality Service Review program in child-welfare programs in Utah. That program 
used stratified random sampling to identify cases for review by a two-person team. Id. at 91-93. 
38. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 7, at 79 (contrasting peer review with “more conventional 
forms of quality assurance”). 
39. Sabel & Simon, supra note 12, at 91. 
40. Ho, supra note 7. 
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county’s health inspectors were randomly assigned to a program in which 
they conducted restaurant inspections together with one other inspector, 
rather than alone. The peer review included not only these paired 
inspections but also weekly training sessions at which difficult issues were 
discussed. These sessions produced guidance memoranda on difficult 
issues, which aided further training. These initiatives significantly 
decreased inconsistency across inspectors, not only for inspections 
conducted jointly, but also for individual inspections conducted by 
inspectors who had participated in the peer review.41 
Peer review makes review nonhierarchical, substituting the review of 
a peer for the review of a higher authority. That substitution most directly 
alters the second and third stages of review: it means that review and initial 
decisionmaking take place simultaneously, and that feedback (the 
analogue of remand in an adversary, hierarchical system) also occurs 
simultaneously. Peer review therefore seems best suited as an intervention 
for adversarial systems of review in which the second and third stages do 
not function well. (In principle, peer review could leave the selection 
process unaltered, with review requested by claimants themselves. But in 
practice, peer-review proposals, like quality assurance proposals, tend not 
to make review depend on claimants’ decision to appeal.) 
Table 1 compares the traditional adversarial model of review with 
quality assurance and peer-review models. Quality assurance and peer 
review both eliminate claimants’ role in selection; peer review also 
dispenses with the hierarchical nature of the review itself.42 Finally, all 
three types of review offer decisionmakers feedback in cases of error, but 
the form of that feedback varies. 
These categories, of course, bleed into each other. For example, both 
quality assurance processes and peer-review proposals may include a 
debriefing component, with the reviewer discussing any errors directly with 
the original decisionmaker. Both also favor selection processes that do not 
depend on action by disappointed claimants. And one can imagine useful 
initiatives that combine features of more than one category. For example, 
Jonah Gelbach and David Marcus propose that federal courts should 
engage in more “problem-oriented” decisionmaking when reviewing 
Social Security and immigration decisions—that is, that courts should pay 
attention to patterns across multiple cases and craft their opinions 
 
41. For a detailed account of the procedures, see id. at 31-38. 
42. Many standard systems of review incorporate an element of peer review: panel 
decisionmaking. When the Social Security Appeals Council decides to grant full review of a case—
which almost always means remand—the signature of a second Administrative Appeals Judge is 
required on the opinion. And before streamlining at the Board of Immigration Appeals in the 
early 2000s, many decisions were reached by panels of three Board members. Of course, the 
federal Courts of Appeals also decide cases in panels of three. 
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accordingly.43 That attention to patterns would integrate some of the 
benefits of the pattern-driven selection that is more common in quality 
assurance proposals. 
 















    










among two or 
more peers 
    







Finally, a third group of reformers does not suggest an overhaul to 
systems of adversarial, hierarchical review but rather proposes making 
such systems more closely resemble appeals in Article III courts. Scholars 
in this group often suggest making adjudicators more independent or 
improving legal representation for litigants. In Social Security disability 
adjudications, ALJs themselves have fiercely defended their 
independence, seeing it as a critical element of fair adjudication.44 Other 
scholars have called for more adversarial process in the form of a lawyer 
representing the government in ALJ hearings.45 And in the immigration 
courts, for example, where the government always has representation but 
 
43. Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume 
Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1134-48 (2018). 
44. See, e.g., Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1133 
(D.D.C. 1984), amended sub nom. Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, No. 83-0124, 1985 
WL 71829 (D.D.C. July 2, 1985) (involving a challenge to procedures limiting the independence 
of ALJs). 
45. See, e.g., David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security 
Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 93 (2006) (recommending 
attorney representation for SSA at ALJ hearings and noting that the Social Security Advisory 
Board has made the same recommendation). 
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immigrants often do not, many have called for government-provided legal 
representation. 
Thinking of review in three stages, and testing whether each stage is 
functional, offers a place to start for policymakers contemplating reforms. 
Flaws in the selection process, for example, invite quality assurance 
solutions, whereas flaws in appellate decisionmaking invite peer review. 
Table 2 shows how the diagnosed problems line up with the possible 
solutions. 
 
Table 2: Review Diagnosis and Possible Policy Responses 
 
 Adversarial Solution Management 
Solution 
   





random selection of 
cases for review 
   
Problems with 
Decisionmaking 
Altered standard of 
review 
Peer review 
   
Problems with Remand 
Avoidance 
Better functioning of 
first two stages to 
increase number of 
remands 
Training and 
feedback for ALJs 
 
This Article uses data from disability adjudications to offer an example of 
such diagnosis. 
II. Social Security Adjudications 
A. Why Study Disparities in Social Security Adjudications? 
Social Security Administrative Law Judges decided an average of 
over 750,000 cases per year from 2010 to 2014—about twice as many cases 
as the federal district courts.46  As the largest single system of adjudication 
in the western world,47 but with a relatively homogeneous caseload, the 
 
46. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2015, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2015 
[https://perma.cc/D5HC-93EE] (noting 361,689 combined civil and criminal filings in the federal 
district courts in 2015). 
47. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 28-29 (2003) (“[T]he Social Security hearing system 
is probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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disability adjudication system offers an excellent test case for theories of 
appeal and administrative review. This study uses newly available 
individual-level case-tracking data to examine whether and how the Social 
Security Appeals Council reduces disparities in ALJs’ decisions to grant 
benefits. 
The disability process employs over 8,000 examiners and over 1,500 
ALJs, and the stakes of disability adjudications are high. District Judge 
Jack B. Weinstein has described disability appeals as in many respects 
“more wrenching than sentencing determinations . . . . [G]rant or denial . . . 
may mean permitting [claimants] to live in dignity or consigning them to 
poverty and charity.”48 Moreover, the accuracy of the Social Security 
adjudication system has important policy implications. The SSDI caseload 
has nearly tripled since 1989.49 Inaccurate denials harm claimants; 
inaccurate allowances strain public resources and discourage claimants 
from working. 
Scholars have long wrestled with large disparities across ALJs and 
have proposed a wide variety of policy changes that might enhance 
consistency. This Article advances that literature by testing whether 
Appeals Council review in fact already promotes consistency across ALJs. 
I apply the three-step theory of review to examine the mechanisms through 
which Appeals Council review might function: litigants’ decisions about 
whether to appeal, Appeals Council decisions about whether to affirm the 
ALJ’s decision, and ALJs’ reactions to remands. 
The Social Security Administration has repeatedly attempted to 
reduce the size of disparities across ALJs and especially to rein in ALJs 
with high allowance rates. Those attempts have met resistance from ALJs 
determined to protect their decisional independence. In Nash v. Califano,50 
a group of ALJs challenged a series of actions taken by SSA to supervise 
them; those actions included monthly quotas for decisions and explicit 
consideration of ALJs’ grant rates; deviations from the average were 
discouraged.51 The court held that the ALJs had standing to pursue their 
claim, and it certified a class.52 Soon after, Congress passed the so-called 
Belmon Amendment, which required the Appeals Council to resume 
review, on its own motion, of ALJs’ decisions to grant benefits;53 SSA 
chose to target judges with high allowance rates. In response, the 
 
48. Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the 
Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 898 (1984). 
49. Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen & Alexander Strand, Does Disability Insurance 
Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI 
Receipt, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1797, 1798 fig.1 (2013).  
50. 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). 
51. Id. at 14. 
52. Nash v. Califano, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1119 (W.D.N.Y. 1981). 
53. Pub. L. 96-265, § 304, 94 Stat. 441, 453-57 (1980). 
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Association of Administrative Law Judges brought suit against the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, arguing that such targeting 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act.54 Once again, however, the 
court did not resolve the underlying dispute. Although it concluded that 
SSA’s implementation of the Belmon Amendment had violated the APA, 
it nonetheless dismissed the case and declined to grant prospective relief 
because SSA had, during litigation, ceased targeting individual ALJs with 
high allowance rates.55 
B. The Disability Claims Process 
Examiners in state Disability Determination Services offices are the 
first officials to review applications for disability, mostly using written 
medical evidence. If the examiner rejects an application, the claimant can 
request “reconsideration”—a written appeal, once again evaluated by a 
state DDS office. If the application is rejected at the reconsideration stage, 
the claimant can appeal again, this time in an oral hearing before a federal 
ALJ. Next, if the Appeals Council denies review or affirms the decision 
below, the claimant may appeal once again in federal district court and 
appeal the decision of that court to a Court of Appeals, and even on to the 
Supreme Court. 
At every stage of review—initial review, reconsideration, ALJ 
hearing, and Appeals Council review—the determination of disability 
takes place in five steps.56 First, SSA asks whether the claimant is currently 
employed—in SSA terminology, whether the claimant is engaged in 
substantial gainful activity (sometimes abbreviated SGA). If so, then the 
claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Second, SSA determines 
whether the claimant has a sufficiently severe and lasting medical 
impairment, or set of impairments, to qualify as disabled. If not, the case 
ends there. Third, SSA considers whether one or more of these 
impairments fits within a predetermined category of disabling 
impairments—a so-called “listing” found in an Appendix to the regulations 
governing disability determinations.57 If the impairments fit a listing, the 
claimant is considered disabled, and the inquiry ends. If the impairments 
do not fit a listing, SSA considers the extent to which these impairments 
may nonetheless prevent work—in SSA jargon, the claimant’s “residual 
functional capacity.”58 At the fourth stage, SSA evaluates whether the 
 
54. Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1133 (D.D.C. 1984), 
amended sub nom. Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, No. 83-0124, 1985 WL 71829 
(D.D.C. July 2, 1985); see 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2018) (specifying duties of employees presiding at 
hearings); 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(E) (2018) (prohibiting performance ratings for ALJs). 
55. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1143. 
56. Regulations set out the same five-step evaluation process for SSDI and SSI. See 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (2020) (SSDI); id. § 416.920 (2020). 
57. Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (2020). 
58. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2020). 
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claimant’s residual functional capacity would allow her to do the type of 
work that she has done in the past. If so, she is not disabled. If not, then 
the final stage of the inquiry concerns whether the claimant could adjust 
and perform some other type of work in the economy. At this last stage, 
SSA considers not only evidence of the claimant’s impairments but also 
other characteristics, such as age and education. 
This five-step test applies regardless of whether a claimant is seeking 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI), but for each program, the ALJ must make an additional 
determination before the final award. To grant Supplemental Security 
Income, the ALJ must determine that the claimant is indigent, and to grant 
Social Security Disability Income, the ALJ must determine that the 
claimant is insured—in other words, that the claimant has paid Social 
Security taxes for long enough to receive benefits.59 
This Article’s analysis begins at the level of ALJ review, which is 
already the third stage of review.60 By beginning the analysis at the ALJ 
review stage, I consider only about one third of all disability claims that are 
denied at the initial level; two thirds never proceed past reconsideration.61 
Yet ALJ review is nonetheless a meaningful place to start. ALJ hearings 
are formal adjudications under the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
they include a range of procedural protections: claimants have a right to 
counsel (at their own expense), and they may present witnesses and appear 
in person or by video conference.62 
Within sixty days of receiving a full or partial denial of benefits from 
an ALJ, a claimant may request review, in writing, by the Appeals 
Council.63 The request for review is accomplished by filling out a simple 
one-page form (HA-520).64 The claimant need not make legal arguments 
or provide briefing, and there is no filing fee. 
 
59. HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 5-6 (2013). 
60. In ten so-called “prototype” states, the reconsideration stage of review has been 
eliminated, so ALJ review makes up the second stage of the process. See DI 12015.100 Disability 
Redesign Prototype Model, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0412015100 [https://perma.cc/MXT9-ZRXK]. 
61. In 2010, there were a total of 2,838,485 total disability-adjudication outcomes at all 
levels of the system; during the period of this study (2010-2014), there were an average of more 
than 800,000 ALJ-level outcomes per year. See Office of Ret. & Disability Policy, Annual 
Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Program, 2011, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., tbl.59, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/sect04.html#table59 
[https://perma.cc/YTG2-EAP8]. 
62. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (2020). 
63. Information About Requesting Review of and Administrative Law Judge’s Hearing 
Decision, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/appeals_process.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SUA-P9S4]. 
64. Request for Review of Hearing Decision/Order, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/forms/ha-520.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4K-4S5Y]. 
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Review within the Appeals Council takes place in two stages. First, an 
analyst—who may or may not be an attorney—reviews the appeal and 
makes a recommendation about whether it should receive “review”—a 
term of art within the Appeals Council that means review by two 
Administrative Appeals Judges.65 If the analyst recommends denial of 
review, the appeal goes to one of fifty-six Appeals Officers, who are 
attorneys, but who lack the authority to grant review. Instead, they issue 
only denials, though they may forward cases on to an Administrative 
Appeals Judge if they disagree with the analyst and believe that review 
should be granted. When either the analyst or the Appeals Officer believes 
that an appeal should receive review, that appeal makes its way to one of 
seventy Administrative Appeals Judges, who are authorized to grant 
review.66 That Administrative Appeals Judge may still decide to deny 
review, but more often he or she brings in a second Administrative 
Appeals Judge.67 If that second judge agrees that it should be reviewed, the 
appeal proceeds to consideration on the merits—what the Appeals Council 
calls review. Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the rate at which the Council 
granted review ranged from 25% to 16%.68 
Once review is granted, the Appeals Council (through two 
Administrative Appeals Judges) may reach one of several decisions. First, 
it may fully or partially affirm or reverse the ALJ’s decision.69 Second, it 
may dismiss a claim for benefits on any ground available to the ALJ.70 
Third, it may vacate the ALJ’s decision and remand the case to the ALJ. 
In practice, however, a decision to have a second AAJ conduct review is a 
decision to reverse: 97% of review decisions are remands or favorable 
dismissals. (Figure 4 shows this process.) 
The Appeals Council may also decide to initiate review on its own 
motion, allowing it to review a small number of allowances in addition to 
the many denials that are appealed by claimants.71 Such review is known 
as pre-effectuation review, since it precedes the effectuation of benefits 
that follows a grant by an ALJ. That review must be initiated within sixty 
days of the final ALJ decision.72 SSA’s regulations foresee review of cases 
 
65. Telephone Interview with Judge (Apr. 28, 2016). 
66. KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 59, at 53.  
67. I-3-8-11. Administrative Appeals Judge’s Actions, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (June 5, 
2015), https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-03/I-3-8-11.html [https://perma.cc/69F7-8RWW]. 
68. AC Grant Review Actions as a Percentage of All AC Dispositions, SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC02_AC_GrantReview_All_Dispositions.html 
[https://perma.cc/3323-6X4F]. Note that the data furnished to me by FOIA request did not include 
a variable indicating whether review was granted; instead, I am able to identify cases that involve 
more than one AAJ.  
69. GN 03104.350 Appeals Council (AC) Jurisdiction, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., at A.2, 
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203104350 [https://perma.cc/4AJR-YSCN]. 
70. Id. 
71. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (2020). 
72. Id. 
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identified through random and selective sampling, as well as of cases 
identified as wrongly decided by another branch of the agency.73 Such 
review is relatively rare; in 2011, it accounted for less than 4% of the 
Council’s caseload.74 Unfortunately, such cases are imperfectly identified 
in the database released to me. Although I was able to identify cases in 
which the Appeals Council conducted review despite a grant of benefits, 
and I removed those from the analysis below, I could not identify own 
motion review cases where the claimant lost or partly lost. Those cases 
therefore remain in the data, but given their small number, they are 


























73. Id. (“We may refer a case requiring effectuation to the Appeals Council if, in the view 
of the effectuating component, the decision cannot be effectuated because it contains a clerical 
error affecting the outcome of the claim; the decision is clearly inconsistent with the Social Security 
Act, the regulations, or a published ruling; or the decision is unclear regarding a matter that affects 
the claim’s outcome.”). 
74. KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 59, at 52. 
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Figure 4: Within-Agency Disability Appeals Process 
 
    Initial Application 
& 
Reconsideration 
(Not in Dataset) 
    
    
 
    
   ALJ Hearing     
    
 
    
   Request for Review 
by Claimant 
    
    
 
    
   Analyst Review     
        
 Appeals 
Officer 













        
   Affirm   Remand 
 
C. Scholarship on Social Security Adjudications 
Disparities in ALJ decisionmaking have prompted handwringing 
from both lawmakers and scholars. In 2011, Sam Johnson, the Chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Social Security (Committee on Ways and Means) 
asked the Inspector General to provide information on ALJ workloads, 
policies, and procedures. Part of the Inspector General’s response was a 
report of 24 ALJs who were outliers in terms of their grant rate or their 
workload.75 The report noted large disparities—for example, allowance 
rates varying from 9% to 95% within a single office76—but also found that 
 
75. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., A-12-11-01138, 
OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WORKLOAD TRENDS 8 (2012).  
76. Id.  
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many of the 24 outliers in its sample appeared less extreme when the nature 
of their caseload was taken into account. 
The size of ALJs’ caseloads does not appear to drive the disparities. 
Harold J. Krent and Scott Morris used disposition data from SSA to 
examine correlates of ALJ allowance rates,77 and they found a modest 
positive association between allowance rates and cases processed. They 
suggested, however, that time pressure did not play a large role in 
encouraging allowances. In particular, they examined decisions during the 
month of September, when the fiscal year is ending and the deadline for 
ALJs’ annual case target looms, and they found that, despite completing 
more cases in that month, ALJs did not increase their allowance rate.78 
Economists, meanwhile, have seen the variance in adjudicators’ 
dispositions as an opportunity for causal inference. An important recent 
article by Nicole Maestas and coauthors combines administrative data 
from the earlier stages of the disability adjudication process with earnings 
data to study the effect of benefits receipt on employment and income.79  
The authors take advantage of (nearly) random assignment of disability 
applications to state-level examiners within the same Disability 
Determination Services office to offer a convincing estimate of this causal 
effect. This effect is large: the authors estimate that, for applicants with 
marginal claims to benefits—that is, those whose claims some examiners 
would grant and others deny—granting benefits reduces the chances of 
employment by 28% in the two years after receipt and 16% four years 
after.80  These estimates highlight the importance of benefits decisions: 
grants and denials carry serious consequences, not only for claimants and 
government expenditures but also for the labor supply. 
I focus on a related but distinct set of costs: the costs of inconsistent 
and unpredictable benefits decisions. Maestas et al. measure part of one of 
these costs: they find that the longer the disability determination process 
takes, the lower the chance that a claimant will later find employment if 
denied benefits.81 If the Appeals Council more effectively reduced 
disparities across ALJs, this cost might initially increase, since more 
claimants would have a chance of obtaining reversals of benefits denials. 
Over time, however—especially with expanded review of benefits grants, 
rather than just of denials—a more effective review process would reduce 
 
77. KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 59, at 10-11. 
78. Id. at 26-28. Although the focus of this Article is on ALJ decisionmaking, federal 
district judges display inconsistency in deciding such cases as well, with large disparities in remand 
rates both within and across district courts. Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and 
Angst in District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 
404 n.164 (2016). 
79. Maestas et al., supra note 49. 
80. Id. at 1818-19. 
81. Id. at 1822 (estimating a depreciation in the chance of employment of approximately 
0.4% per month over four months). 
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the costs of uncertainty by decreasing disparities across adjudicators and 
ultimately lowering the number of initial disability claims. 
Finally, scholars and officials have collaborated to describe possible 
reforms to the system. In 1990, Charles H. Koch, Jr. and David A. Koplow 
released an Administrative Conference study on the role and effectiveness 
of the Social Security Appeals Council.82 Koch and Koplow pointed out 
that objective measurement of the accuracy of disability decisions is likely 
impossible, for several reasons. The appellate outcome is far from the last 
word on accuracy: review is asymmetric, with only denials of benefits 
reaching appeal, and cases change throughout the process, since new 
evidence may be introduced on appeal.83 Koch and Koplow concluded that 
the Appeals Council was overwhelmed by its caseload and that any 
significant reforms would need to start with mechanisms for reducing that 
caseload. They found that a typical day for an Appeals Council member 
began with the receipt of two or three dozen new cases, meaning that 
simple denials might receive only a few minutes of attention each.84 
Perhaps more disturbing still, Koch and Koplow concluded that “ALJs 
generally do not see the Appeals Council as a legitimate appellate body.”85 
ALJs’ common criticisms included the view that Appeals Council 
adjudicators lacked training and experience and that the Council was 
subject to political manipulation.86 
More optimistically, in a 2015 article, Gerald K. Ray and Jeffrey S. 
Lubbers describe a collaboration between the Administration Conference 
and the Appeals Council to learn from the adjudication data that SSA 
collects.87 They emphasize the role of electronic processes in improving the 
quality of decisions, of decision trees in identifying noncompliance with 
agency policy, and of data analysis in identifying anomalies. These steps 
arose partly from Administrative Conference studies urging further use of 
the adjudication data at SSA’s disposal.88 The changes also broaden quality 
assurance measures that have long been in place. In 1981, Deborah A. 
 
82. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of 
the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 199 (1990). 
83. Id. at 271-75.  
84. Id. at 239-40. 
85. Id. at 294. 
86. Id. at 293-94. 
87. Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: 
How Data Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative 
Conference of the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1575 (2015).  
88. See Krent & Morris, supra note 78, at 370-71; see also ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., SSA DISABILITY BENEFITS PROGRAMS: THE DUTY OF CANDOR AND SUBMISSION OF ALL 
EVIDENCE (2012) (considering whether SSA should require claimants to disclose evidence 
unfavorable to their case); STEPHANIE J. TATHAM & MATHEW LEE WIENER, ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EVALUATING SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS IN DISABILITY CLAIMS 54-55 
(2012).  
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Chassman and Howard Rolston took up Mashaw’s call for further use of 
quality assurance, describing the implementation of such a system for 
disability adjudications.89 They concluded that the program had only had a 
limited impact so far, but that it had the potential to lead to significant 
improvements through the use of discriminant analysis to identify errors. 
The authors also observed quality assurance results that matched the 
selection results in this Article: errors were much more common in 
appealed denial decisions than in those that remained unappealed.90 
Finally, a 2016 study by Jonah Gelbach and David Marcus offers a 
thorough and useful account of the role of judicial review in Social Security 
disability determinations.91 Gelbach and Marcus largely focus on the role 
of federal district courts, but in the process they also offer one of the best 
accounts of the actual work processes of ALJs and the Appeals Council.92 
Ultimately, they provide a rich account of the reasons for frequent 
remands from federal district court (as well as for variation in remand rates 
across districts); they also offer a series of detailed policy 
recommendations. Most relevant here is their recommendation that the 
agency focus more on experimentalist attempts to facilitate mutual 
learning and perhaps less on supervision for technical policy compliance.93 
These proposals are only the tip of the iceberg. Other scholars have 
canvassed policy alternatives ranging from a specialized Article I court for 
review of disability claims to the replacement of the all-or-nothing 
disability judgment with a graduated disability scale, similar to the scale 
used for veterans’ benefits.94 What scholars have not yet produced is an 
empirical appraisal of each stage of the Appeals Council process. Such an 
appraisal helps in choosing among the many proposed reforms. 
III. Reviewing Appeals Council Review 
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data come from a FOIA request to the Social Security 
Administration, submitted in March 2014 and fulfilled in September 2015. 
The dataset includes all cases appealed to ALJs, including cases arising 
through continuing review of initial grants of benefits, that were closed 
during fiscal years 2010-2014. (The fiscal year runs from October 1-
 
89. Deborah A. Chassman & Howard Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings: A 
Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 801-03 (1981). 
90. Id. at 819. 
91. JONAH B. GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A 
STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2016). 
92. Id. at 17-30. 
93. Id. at 168-71. 
94. See, e.g., Paul Verkuil & Jeffrey Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review 
of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 733, 736 (2003) (describing Article I 
proposals); Autor & Duggan, supra note 45, at 94. 
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September 30.) Because appeals can take more than a year to be decided, 
I use only ALJ decisions reached between 2010 and 2012. In order to take 
advantage of the quasi-experiment provided by random assignment of 
cases to judges, and to match cases across levels of adjudication, I use a 
subset of the dataset for the estimates described below. Appendix A 
provides the details of these sample restrictions, as well as a description of 
the ways in which the assumption of random assignment of cases to judges 
does not hold in many hearing offices and time periods. In the subset of 
hearing offices and time periods used in the analysis below, observable 
patterns in the data are consistent with random assignment. 
The data include the dates on which hearings and appeals were 
requested and decided, as well as the dates of the final dispositions by ALJs 
and the Appeals Council. Each case includes the sex and birth date of the 
claimant, as well as whether he or she was represented by a lawyer 
(although this field is inconsistently left blank). Crucially, the data include 
unique identifiers for the ALJ who decided the case as well as the hearing 
office at which it was decided; an identifier for the Appeals Officer or 
Administrative Appeals Judge who decided the case is also included. Table 
3 shows descriptive statistics, displaying the age and sex of successful and 
unsuccessful claimants, as well as whether they are represented by an 
attorney. In both datasets, SSI and SSDI claims are treated separately, but 
I combine them for the bulk of the analysis because both claims require a 
determination of disability.95 I categorize an outcome before an ALJ as a 
win if, for either an SSDI or SSI claim (or both), the ALJ makes a decision 
favorable to the claimant. The results in Tables 3 & 4 come from the 
restricted sample that I use throughout the Article, but the numbers in the 
full sample are similar. 
Table 3 shows the winnowing of cases during the appeals process, 
displaying the percentage of claimants who appeal (among those who lost 
at least one of their claims before the ALJ), the percentage who reach an 
Administrative Appeals Judge, the percentage who reach a panel of two 
judges, and the percentage who obtain reversal or remand. Figure 4 
accompanies Table 4, showing the within-agency appeals process in the 
form of a flow chart. 
 
 
95. Combining the two types of claims makes sense because I am interested in whether a 
claimant obtained benefits; I only count a decision as negative if an individual obtained neither 
type of benefits. 
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Unsuccessful 
Claimants 39 50% 57% 
Successful Claimants 45 51% 80% 
    
Total 42 50% 69% 
 
Table 4: Winnowing of Cases on Appeal 
 
Stage of Proceeding 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent of Previous 
Stage 
   
Initial Hearing 663,901 100% 
Appealable Loss (SSDI or 
SSI) 325,915 49% 
Appeal 143,242 44% 
Review by at Least One 
AAJ 76,910 54% 
Review by Two AAJs 26,828 35% 
Remand or Favorable 
Dismissal 26,108 97% 
 
Nearly half of all disappointed claimants file an appeal—a large 
proportion, particularly given the relative rarity of remand. This may 
reflect the lack of a filing fee and little need for briefing. Once an appeal is 
filed, actual review—in which two Administrative Appeals Judges evaluate 
the case on its merits—is rare. About half of all appeals reach an 
Administrative Appeals Judge, and review occurs in fewer than 20%. The 
rest are directed by an analyst to an Appeals Officer for denial. If a case 
receives review by two AAJs, finally, it is nearly certain to result in a 
remand or a favorable dismissal; the effective decision to remand occurs 
with the decision to review. 
B. Litigant Selection 
The theory of review predicts that litigants are more likely to appeal 
the decisions of judges who are systematically harsher. In the context of 
disability adjudications, I expect claimants to appeal more often when they 
are denied benefits by a harsher judge. I expect this partly because the 
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Social Security Administration makes public the number of decisions each 
ALJ has reached each year, as well as how many were awards and how 
many were denials.96 Websites make the data easily available to claimants 
and their lawyers.97 Because claimants know both the overall grant rate of 
their ALJ, and whether they consider the denial of their benefits unfair, I 
expect that: 
 
H1: Assignment to an ALJ with a lower allowance rate (compared to the 
rates of others in his or her hearing office) increases the probability that a 
claimant will appeal a denial of benefits.98 
 
Figure 5 shows a visual test of this hypothesis. As predicted, claimants 
are more likely to appeal the decisions of harsher judges.99 Each dot 
represents one judge; the vertical axis shows claimants’ rate of appeal (by 
judge), and the horizontal access shows the judge’s allowance rate relative 
to the rates of the other judges in his or her hearing office, with the average 
set to zero.100 Looking from top left to bottom right, as the ALJ’s allowance 
rate increases, the likelihood that his or her decisions will be appealed 
decreases. 
The same pattern holds in linear regressions (Table 5) that include 
office-year fixed effects (which controls for the idiosyncratic characteristics 
of individual hearing offices and individual years).101 The regressions also 
control for claimants’ age and sex, as well as whether each claimant had a 
lawyer.102 In any case, I show estimates with and without controls, so the 
reader can choose among specifications. The estimates suggest a 31-38% 
percent difference in rates of appeal between judges with 0% and 100% 
relative allowance rates. This translates into a 13-15 percentage point 
decrease in the chance of appeal from a denial when moving from a judge 
 
96. ALJ Disposition Data FY 2021, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html [https://perma.cc/D3HL-
J7KQ]. 
97. See, e.g., Disability Judges: Administrative Law Judge Case Statistics, DISABILITY 
JUDGES (2021), https://www.disabilityjudges.com [https://perma.cc/D89C-7RR5] (allowing 
allowance-rate searches by judge name and state). 
98. Although assignment of cases to judges in the sample appears close to random, that 
randomness does not mean that judge allowance rates themselves are randomly assigned. Instead, 
random assignment to a judge means random assignment to a cluster of characteristics, of which 
the allowance rate is one measure.  
99. Note that the appeal rate includes only cases in which the claimant was denied 
benefits (either SSDI or SSI), so this correlation is not simply mechanical. 
100. I consider disparities only within (rather than across) hearing offices, and I test for 
random assignment of cases to judges. I find strong evidence that cases are not, in fact, randomly 
assigned in many hearing offices. In order to draw valid inferences about the size of disparities, I 
concentrate on a subset of hearing offices and time periods in which assignment appears to have 
been random. The Appendix offers details. 
101. I use linear probability models throughout. 
102. Given the assumption of random assignment within courts, controlling for these 
claimant characteristics should not be necessary to correct bias, but the controls may increase the 
precision of the estimates. 
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20% less generous than his or her office average to one 20% more 
generous. Since the rate of appeal is just under 45% during this period, that 
is approximately a 30% relative increase in the chance of appeal—a large 
increase. Table 5 shows these regression estimates. 
 
Figure 5: Claimant Selection 
 
 
Note: Each circle represents 1/100th of the range of ALJ allowance rates (centered 
around each hearing office mean); each circle contains the cases of one or more ALJs 
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Table 5: Claimant Selection 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant appeals 
 













    




























N 325915 325734 325734 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The first stage of the review process works as expected. Litigants select 
more extreme opinions for appeal, sparing the Appeals Council the task of 
sifting through all ALJ decisions. This result is credible: because the 
assignment of the ALJ is nearly random, we can interpret these results as 
showing the causal effect of that assignment. 
There is, however, one wrinkle. The effect of ALJs’ allowance rates 
on claimants’ choices about whether to appeal depends partly on whether 
those claimants are represented. That pattern is shown by the last row in 
Table 5—the interaction term (Representation*ALJ Allowance Rate). 
That term represents the association between appeals and the combination 
of representation and the judge’s grant rate. The negative coefficient 
means that claimants without a lawyer (or other representative) are less 
influenced by the allowance rate of their ALJ than those who are 
represented.103 Note, however, that the presence of an attorney is not 
 
103. The dataset does not indicate whether the representative is an attorney; 
nonattorneys may represent claimants as well. Note that the coefficient on representation alone 
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randomly assigned; for example, claimants with better cases may have 
more success in finding a lawyer to take their case on contingency. The 
presence of a lawyer therefore might or might not suggest that the lawyer 
has a causal effect. It is also possible that some characteristic of the 
claimant, leading to representation, has an effect on whether the claimant 
appeals, and that the regressions are picking up that effect. In sum, it is 
clear that being assigned to a harsher judge makes claimants more likely to 
appeal. Having a lawyer might also make them more likely to appeal—but 
the evidence for that is not causal, since attorneys are not randomly 
assigned. 
Claimant selection of cases works: claimants systematically choose 
more often to appeal the decisions of harsher judges. This does not mean, 
however, that the selection process is perfect. It may well be, for example, 
that unrepresented claimants too often fail to appeal, and that random 
sampling of denials in their cases would enhance consistency. Moreover, 
the observed effect, though large, could be larger still; in an ideal world, 
harsher judges might be even more likely to see their decisions appealed. 
And we know for certain that there is no selection process for generous 
ALJs’ decisions, since the government cannot appeal. Yet this finding 
should, at a minimum, lead policymakers to hesitate before implementing 
a reform—such as a quality assurance system that randomly selects cases 
for review—that eliminates the role of claimants in selecting cases for 
appeal. 
C. Decisionmaking 
After claimants have chosen cases for appeal, the Appeals Council 
must evaluate those appeals for (1) an abuse of discretion by the ALJ, (2) 
legal error, (3) findings not supported by substantial evidence, and (4) “a 
broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the general public 
interest.”104 The Appeals Council may also consider new evidence on 
appeal, but only if it relates to the claimant’s condition before the ALJ 
hearing.105 Assuming that harsher ALJs are more likely to make legal 
errors and factual findings that harm the claimant’s chances, and that 
harsher ALJs are more likely to abuse their discretion in that direction, 
those ALJs should more often be reversed when claimants appeal—as long 
as, as I have suggested earlier, claimants do not have perfect information 
about whether a decision was extreme. I test the following hypothesis: 
 
 
simply shows that people with lawyers are more likely to appeal—an unsurprising result that could 
reflect the effect of either the presence of a lawyer or some other systematic difference between 
represented and unrepresented cases.  
104. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (2020). 
105. Id. 
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H2: Appeals from ALJs with lower allowance rates are more likely to result 
in reversals than appeals from those ALJs’ more generous colleagues. 
 
Testing this hypothesis yields the opposite of the expected result: the 
higher the ALJ’s allowance rate, the higher his or her reversal rate. Figure 
6 shows this visually. This means that more generous ALJs—those who 
more rarely deny claims—are nonetheless more likely to be reversed on 
the rare occasions when they do deny such claims. Regressions with office-
year fixed effects and other controls confirm this strange pattern. The 
results are in Table 6 below. This second main result relies on the near-
random assignment of judges to cases, and it therefore has a causal 
interpretation: assignment to a harsher judge does not, on average, cause 
claimants to appeal more often. 
Notably, however, the pattern in Figure 6 looks slightly nonlinear. In 
fact, Figure 6 might at first seem to show that the decisionmaking process 
is working, since more extreme judges are more likely to be reversed, 
regardless of whether they are generous or harsh. But recall that the 
reversals here are only of denials. The appeals process is therefore making 
both very harsh and very generous judges more generous. 
Judges who are extremely harsh relative to their peers (more than 20 
percentage points below their hearing office average) may be slightly more 
likely to be reversed, as the theory predicts. But so are judges who are more 
generous than their peers, and the effect is stronger for those generous 
judges. That pattern might make sense if the government were also 
appealing, but it is harder to make sense of given that the only appeals in 
the data here are those in which the claimant lost before the ALJ. I call this 
pattern only slightly nonlinear, and do not draw strong conclusions from it, 
because (in sharp contrast to Figure 5) the trend looks roughly flat through 
most of the data. 
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Figure 6: Reversals at the Appeals Council 
 
 
Note: Each circle represents 1/100th of the range of ALJ allowance rates (centered 
around each hearing office mean); each circle contains the cases of one or more ALJs 
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Table 6: Appellate Decisionmaking 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant obtains reversal or remand 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 






































N 142904 142770 142770 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
What might explain this pattern? One possibility is that judges at both ends 
of the distribution are more careless, and that the appeals process is 
detecting those errors. But it remains troubling that claimants denied 
benefits by an ALJ 40% more generous than the hearing office mean are 
actually more likely to succeed on appeal than claimants denied benefits 
by a median ALJ. One would have expected the opposite: that only truly 
meritless cases would be denied by extremely generous ALJs, and that 
those denials would be very unlikely to be overturned on appeal. 
The most plausible explanation for this strange pattern is that 
different types of cases are appealed from harsher and more generous 
judges. Denials of benefits by generous ALJs are much more likely to be 
dismissals (usually for failure to appear). This is unsurprising, though not 
immediately obvious. Because generous ALJs are more likely to exercise 
their discretion in favor of claimants, a smaller proportion of their denials 
should reflect exercises of discretion against claimants, and a 
correspondingly larger proportion should be relatively nondiscretionary 
denials, such as dismissals. Dismissals, unlike other denials, automatically 
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reach an Administrative Appeals Judge.106 Dismissals may therefore be 
driving the unexpected pattern in the data. 
Controlling for ALJs’ dismissal rate offers evidence for this view. 
Table 7 shows the same basic regressions as in Table 6, but the second and 
third models now control for the rate at which ALJs dismiss cases. Adding 
that term to the regression eliminates the counterintuitive effect of ALJ 
allowance rates on reversal rates: the appeals process targets dismissals for 
particularly stringent review, and that targeting happens to reverse 
generous judges’ denials. Here, I must acknowledge that dismissals are not 
randomly assigned, and that this result is not a simple causal one: it is 
possible that those judges with higher dismissal rates are different in other 
respects that drive these results. Moreover, the association with dismissals 
is smaller when I include other variables in the model (though it persists 
when I disaggregate the stages of review below). Dismissals may therefore 
be systematically associated with representation, age and gender. Still, 
given the qualitative evidence, I think it is likely that dismissals partly drive 
the pattern shown in Figure 6. 
 
106. Interview with Appeals Council Official, in Falls Church, Va. (May 20, 2016). 
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Table 7: Dismissal Rates and Reversal Rates 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant obtains reversal or remand 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 


















    





























N 142904 142904 134096 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Although controlling for dismissal rates accounts for the perverse 
pattern of more reversals for more generous judges, it does not generate 
the expected, opposite pattern. Why not? Here, I offer a guess based on 
interviews and aggregate statistics. ALJs said that the Appeals Council 
rarely questions ALJs’ overall findings and conclusions; instead, it focuses 
on the adequacy of the ALJ’s articulated rationale at each step of the 
opinion. This approach partly reflects the deference that the Appeals 
Council owes ALJs’ findings: the Council affirms those findings if they are 
supported by substantial evidence, but it reverses any legal error, since it 
does not defer to ALJs’ legal determinations. 
Perhaps, then, dismissals are one portion of a more general story. If 
the Appeals Council focuses particularly on clear errors in the ALJ’s 
reasoning, it may be less likely to reverse on relatively discretionary 
grounds. Unfortunately, the individual-level data released to me contain 
little information about the reasons for either ALJ or Appeals Council 
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decisions. The Appeals Council does, however, publish aggregate statistics 
on the most common reasons for remand. 
These data support the view that the Appeals Council focuses on 
errors in ALJs’ articulation of reasons. Table 8, reproduced from the SSA 
website,107 shows the most common remand reasons in 2014. (These 
reasons have changed little from year to year.) 
 
Table 8: Remand Reasons 
 
Percent of Cited 
Reasons Remand Reason 
  
8.7 Inadequate Evaluation: Mental Limitations 
6.2 New Evidence on Appeal 
3.9 Failure to Discuss Doctor’s Opinion 
3.8 Inadequate Consideration: Mental Disorder 
3.8 Inadequate Evaluation: Limits on Exertion 
2.7 Inadequate Evaluation: Limits on Manipulation 
2.6 
Inadequate Rationale: Weight Given 
Consultative Examination  
2.4 Failure to Discuss Source 
2.4 




Eight of the nine reasons (excluding Other) concern the adequacy of 
the ALJ’s articulation of reasons for the decision. The ninth—new 
evidence presented for review—reflects a factor outside the control of the 
ALJ. This list reflects the Appeals Council’s focus on the adequacy of 
ALJs’ reasoning; unlike a federal court of appeals, the Appeals Council 
cannot affirm on any ground that the record supports. For example, in 
some cases, a nonexamining source’s opinion might be useless (or at least 
relatively unhelpful), but a remand could result if that opinion is not 
identified or discussed. The same point applies to the other remand 
reasons. 
Perhaps the counterintuitive pattern in reversals also reflects 
decisionmaking procedures within the Appeals Council. The individual-
level data allow a more detailed look at the stages of that process. Recall 
that the first Appeals Council employee to look at a request for review is 
 
107. Top 10 Remand Reasons Cited by the AC on Remands of RRs or Own Motion 
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an analyst, who may or may not be an attorney. The analyst uses a seven-
page electronic worksheet to assess whether the ALJ complied with SSA 
policies at each step of the decision.108 The details of the worksheet are 
confidential, but Appeals Council officials describe it as based on common 
problems identified in ALJ opinions—the types of problems listed in Table 
8 above. After filling out the worksheet, the analyst makes a 
recommendation; if the analyst recommends review, the case goes on to an 
Administrative Appeals Judge, and if the analyst recommends denial of 
review, the case usually, but far from always, goes to an Appeals Officer. 
The database records whether a request for review was denied by an 
Appeals Officer or an Administrative Appeals Judge.109 It is at this stage 
of Appeals Council review that the surprising pattern in decisionmaking is 
strongest: judges with high allowance rates are much more likely to have 
requests for review decided by an AAJ. Again, this pattern mostly 
disappears with a control for judges’ dismissal rates. Tables 9 and 10 show 
the effect of judges’ allowance rates at each stage of the Appeals Council 
decisionmaking process. Table 9 shows these effects without controlling 
for judges’ dismissal rates; Table 10 includes that control variable. 
Here, I should pause to emphasize that this set of regressions showing 
the relationship between dismissal rates, representation, and remands does 
not have a straightforward causal interpretation. Neither dismissal nor 
representation is randomly assigned. Unlike Tables 5 and 6, then, in which 
the coefficients have a straightforward quantifiable interpretation, Tables 
7-10 offer only clues about the reasons for the puzzling decisionmaking 
pattern—quantitative clues that require qualitative context. 
 
108. Interview with Appeals Council Official, in Falls Church, Va. (May 20, 2016). 
109. I distinguish between the two types of adjudicators using the fact that Appeals 
Officers can issue only denials of review. I therefore categorize adjudicators with zero percent 
review rates as Appeals Officers. Since Appeals Officers can and sometimes do become 
Administrative Appeals Judges, I perform this categorization by month. 
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Table 9: Effect of ALJ Allowance Rates by Stage of Appeals Council 
Decisionmaking 
 

















































N 142601 76842 26794 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 10: Effect of ALJ Allowance Rates by Stage of Appeals Council 
Decisionmaking (Accounting for Dismissals) 
 




























































N 142601 76842 26794 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Interviews with former AAJs, ALJs, and an Appeals Council analyst 
suggest a possible explanation for the particularly large effect of judge 
allowance rates at the initial stage of sorting requests for review between 
Appeals Officers and Administrative Appeals Judges. When analysts are 
unsure of the right outcome,110 they are more likely to bring the case to an 
AAJ, who has the power to issue either decision. Analysts are perhaps 
more likely to be unsure about their recommendation when they find some 
error in the ALJ’s articulation of reasons for the decision, even if that error 
is minor. ALJs with high allowance rates may have higher rates of policy 
 
110. Telephone Interview with Former Appeals Council Analyst (May 19, 2016). 
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noncompliance in the articulation of the rationale for denials. Denials by 
more generous judges may also more commonly be easy cases, in which 
the ALJ need not strain to reach a denial decision. Paradoxically, the 
strength of the evidence underlying a denial might lead the ALJ not to 
articulate a rationale as carefully, making the Appeals Council analyst 
unsure whether to refer a case to an Appeals Officer or an Administrative 
Appeals Judge.111 
This hypothesis is consistent with the views of ALJs, who complain 
about the technical nature of the remands that they receive. One ALJ, for 
example, when asked to describe examples of remands, described two 
highly technical errors.112 First, he complained that the Appeals Council is 
too demanding of ALJs in presenting the reasons for dismissals for failure 
to appear at a hearing. “Dismissals consume an inordinate amount of 
time,” he said. “No other court requires a judge to jump through all the 
hoops the Appeals Council does to reach a claimant. We almost have to 
prove that the claimant got the notice.” Second, he described being 
reversed because he had failed to enter a piece of evidence into the 
record—and then realizing that his failure reflected the fact that the 
evidence had been submitted the day after he had issued his decision. 
(Recall that the Appeals Council will accept new evidence as long as it is 
related to the period before the ALJ hearing.) 
Other ALJs offered similar accounts. One retired judge, who served 
both on the Appeals Council and as an ALJ, said he thought that the 
Appeals Council rarely reversed on the ground that an ALJ abused his or 
her discretion or reached a factual finding unsupported by substantial 
evidence. “I don’t think they are substituting their judgment,” he said.113 
Much more common were reversals on the basis of new evidence or for 
legal error. 
To sum up, I have offered causal evidence that assignment to a 
harsher judge does not make claimants more likely to obtain a remand 
after appealing. The decisionmaking stage of Appeals Council review does 
not promote uniformity in ALJ decisionmaking. My hypotheses about the 
mechanisms driving this result—the checklist-like focus on procedure at 
the Appeals Council, combined with deferential review of factual 
conclusions and the lack of a harmless error doctrine—depend more on 
the qualitative evidence and are therefore more speculative. 
Of course, the lack of a consistency-enhancing effect of the 
decisionmaking process is offset by the effect of the selection process. 
Taken together, the selection and decisionmaking phases of Appeals 
 
111. This possibility suggests a potential tradeoff between error correction and 
consistency promotion: it may be that the most generous ALJs do make more errors. But the 
result—that they receive remands at a higher rate, pushing their allowance rates higher still—
seems unintended. 
112. Telephone Interview with Administrative Law Judge (Apr. 27, 2016). 
113. Telephone Interview with Former Administrative Law Judge (May 11, 2016). 
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Council review do exert a small consistency-promoting (discretion-
limiting) effect. Table 11 shows estimates of the overall effect of the 
process—that is, the effect of ALJ allowance rates on whether denials are 
both appealed and reversed. These estimates therefore combine selection 
and decisionmaking effects. Since the consistency-enhancing effect of the 
selection process is larger than the consistency-defeating effect of the 
decisionmaking process, the effect of the process overall is to promote 
consistency, but to a very modest degree. The results suggest about a 1-2 
percentage-point decrease in the chance of appeal and remand when 
moving from a judge 20% less generous than his or her office average to a 
judge 20% more generous. In other words, the appeals process does limit 
discretion but not enough to make a large dent in the cross-ALJ disparities. 
 
Table 11: Overall Effect of ALJ Allowance Rates on Appeals Council 
Reversals 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 






































N 325915 325734 325734 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include year and office fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
D. Remand Avoidance 
The selection phase of Social Security Appeals Council review 
promotes consistency and thereby limits the discretion of ALJs. The 
decisionmaking phase does the opposite. Together, they have a slight 
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consistency-enhancing effect. In the third phase, how do ALJs themselves 
react when they receive remands and must conduct new hearings? Recall 
the third implication of the theory: line-level adjudicators react to remands 
by avoiding the type of decision that led to remand, and they react most 
often in the immediate aftermath of a remand. Since remands are relatively 
rare for individual ALJs—most months pass without a remand for any 
given ALJ—and since remands arrive long after an initial decision, I am 
able to test whether hearing a case after remand temporarily influences a 
judge’s decisions. I expect that: 
 
H3: Hearing more cases after remand in a given time period causes an ALJ 
to issue fewer denials in other, unrelated cases in that time period. This 
effect is larger soon after post-remand hearings. 
 
Before describing the test of this hypothesis, let me pause to address 
a counterargument: suppose that individual remands contain very little 
information about the chance of reversal in other, similar cases. If so, ALJs 
would correctly ignore them. Remand decisions might contain little 
information if they were made randomly, but the results above do not have 
that implication. Instead, I found a small but not trivial overall consistency-
promoting effect from the selection and decisionmaking processes, taken 
together. This finding suggests that ALJs will avoid making similar errors 
in the period immediately after receiving a remand and that their 
allowance rates will rise as a result. 
To test this third hypothesis, I use panel regressions that measure 
whether judges issue a higher proportion of allowances, on average, in 
periods in which they decide additional cases after remand. I run these 
regressions for four different time period lengths: one week, two weeks, 
one month, and two months. The regressions test for an effect within each 
time period for each judge. Since hearings after remand arrive on an ALJ’s 
schedule a long (and varying) time after the initial decision, there is no 
reason to believe that patterns in initial decisions drive the effect. Still, to 
interpret these regressions as measuring the causal effect of receiving a 
remand, we must assume that the grant rates of ALJs who received 
remands would have followed the same trend, had they not received 
remands, as those who in fact received no remands. 
The results, presented in Table 12, weakly suggest that this remand 
avoidance effect may exist, but that it is small. An additional decision after 
remand in a given week makes an ALJ a little less than 0.4% more likely 
to issue allowances in that week. The effect is statistically significant but 
very small; remands are not a large factor in ALJs’ decisionmaking, even 
in the week in which they must make a decision in light of the remand. As 
expected, the effect diminishes as the time period lengthens: remands 
influence ALJs more soon after they must hold new hearings based on 
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those remands.114 Table 13 shows the same results, this time controlling for 
the age and sex of the claimant and the volume of cases before the ALJ in 
each time period. The results are similar. 
I urge extreme caution in interpreting these results, however. In the 
Appendix, although I find similar results in one other specification, I also 
find that remands appear to have an inconsistent, opposite effect as of the 
date the appeals are decided (as opposed to the date when the ALJ hearing 
in the remanded case is held). I would not overinterpret this contrary 
evidence, either; ALJs told me that they became aware of remands only 
when those remands came before them. But the sensitivity of the analysis 
to the use of different dates should reduce confidence in the results. There 
is also a practical reason to doubt that remands have a large effect on ALJ 
behavior. Although ALJs determine the outcomes of cases, they do not 
write the first drafts of the decisions themselves. That task is completed by 
decision writers.115 Remands may therefore hold more obvious lessons for 
decision writers than for ALJs.116 
If ALJs’ remand avoidance does in fact have a small impact on 
outcomes, it is worth noticing that the effect might be larger if remands 
were more frequent. For example, if some ALJs were to receive ten to 
twenty remands in a month, these results might imply a one-to-two 
percentage increase in allowance rate for those ALJs. Although the effect 
of remands might attenuate as more are received, the opposite is also 
possible: more remands might have increasing effect as they have a 
discernible impact on a judge’s workload. 
In sum, there is weak, limited evidence of a small effect of remands 
on ALJ behavior. Soon after receiving a remand, ALJs change their 
behavior in a way that may make further remands less likely. If this effect 
is real, decreased deference from the Appeals Council—and the resulting 
increase in remands—could create a virtuous cycle, causing ALJs to alter 





114. This larger effect in smaller time periods may reflect both proximity in time to the 
remand and the fact that, in shorter periods, the same number of remands makes up a larger 
proportion of the relevant cases that the ALJ is deciding. 
115. For a discussion of the role of decision writers, see generally OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SECURITY ADMIN,, A-12-18-50579, DECISION-WRITING BACKLOG IN 
THE OFFICE OF HEARING OPERATIONS (2019). 
116. I am grateful for Harold Krent for this point. 
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Table 12: ALJs React to Remands 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant wins 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 












N 2576337 2576340 2576341 2576341 
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered on office-ALJ) 
Models include time period and office-ALJ fixed effects 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 13: ALJs React to Remands (with Control Variables) 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant wins 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 











































N 2572567 2572570 2572571 2572571 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include month and office-ALJ fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on office-ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
IV. Comparisons and Implications 
This Article has proposed a method of diagnosing problems in 
systems of review. In the Social Security context, that method offers 
reasons for reformers to focus their attention on decisionmaking processes 
and criteria at the Appeals Council. The same method can yield insights 
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not only for other agencies, but also for other areas in which the 
government must supervise decisionmakers. This Part first surveys two 
areas where the empirical results are already in: patent and immigration 
adjudication. In both areas, the method reveals the systems’ relative 
strengths and weaknesses. This Part concludes by comparing all three areas 
of adjudication (patent, immigration, and disability) and discussing lessons 
for the disability adjudications. 
Why compare Social Security adjudications with patent and 
immigration adjudications? The systems share not only institutional 
features but also a policy challenge: large disparities across adjudicators in 
grant rates.117 In Figure 7, I compare the distribution of ALJs’ allowance 
rates with the equivalent distributions for immigration judges, patent 
examiners, and federal district judges making decisions about whether to 
incarcerate a criminal defendant. The disability, immigration, and 
incarceration rates are centered around zero (that is, demeaned): I subtract 
the hearing office (or immigration court) average from each judge’s 
allowance rate. This means that the rates reflect within-office comparisons 
only—except in the patent context.  To create this comparison, I rely on 
Frakes and Wasserman’s work on patent adjudications, as well as Crystal 
Yang’s work on sentencing disparities, and on my past work on 
immigration adjudications.118 
The comparison supports widespread concerns about disparities in 
disability, immigration, and patent adjudications: disparities in federal 
judges’ incarceration decisions are far smaller than those in any of the three 
agencies. This is not to say that federal judges might not generate similarly 
disparate outcomes in other contexts. In particular, Krent and Morris find 
large disparities in Social Security outcomes both within and across federal 
district courts,119 but I lack the data to place those disparities on the same 
scale here. In addition, disparities across patent examiners appear larger 
than those across immigration judges and Social Security ALJs, but the 
immigration and disability disparities shown below are disparities within 
hearing offices and immigration courts, whereas the patent disparities do 
not include that adjustment.120 
 
 
117. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board’s Consistency-Enhancing Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2417, 2427-29 (2019); JAYA RAMJI-
NOGALES ET AL., supra note 2, at 325-39. 
118. Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory 
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1300-26 (2014). 
119. Krent & Morris, supra note 77, at 404 n.164. 
120. Frakes and Wasserman make a similar adjustment with a variety of control 
variables, and that adjustment does decrease the dispersion. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 
117, at 2429 fig.2. To make this comparison, I use their reported standard deviation in examiner 
grant rates. Id. at 2427. 
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Figure 7: Disparities Compared 
 
 
Figure 7 shows a remarkable commonality across these three 
agencies. In all three, the adjudicator’s identity is often decisive for the 
outcome of the case. And for each agency, we now have some evidence on 
how and whether review processes increase consistency. The theory 
proposed in this Article makes meaningful comparisons possible and leads 
to suggestions for further research. 
A. Patent Adjudication 
Patent adjudications offer a natural comparison for Social Security 
disability adjudications, with a similar scale (over 600,000 decisions in 2017 
alone121) and a similar agency appeals process. And Melissa Wasserman 
and Michael Frakes, two leading empirical scholars of patent 
adjudications, have recently assessed the consistency-enhancing effect of a 
new administrative appeals process using methods similar to those 
proposed here. Their important finding—that an expanded patent appeals 
process increases consistency across patent examiners—illustrates the 
usefulness of the method proposed here. This method also leads to a 
suggested extension of their work. 
Frakes and Wasserman study the effect of the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”) on the decisionmaking of examiners—line-level 
decisionmakers.122 Frakes and Wasserman find that the patent rejections 
of restrictive examiners are more likely to be reversed on appeal than those 
 
121. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 117, at 2418. 
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of lenient examiners and that the patent issuances of lenient examiners are 
more likely to be targeted for PTAB review than the issuances of 
restrictive examiners.123 In addition, they find that examiners alter their 
grant rates in response to reversals by the PTAB—but also that reversals 
of patent rejections deter examiners more than reversals of patent 
issuances.124 They conclude, inter alia, that the PTAB could decrease 
mistaken patent issuance by more often targeting lenient patent examiners 
for review. 
This Article’s theory suggests a possible extension of Frakes and 
Wasserman’s work. They explain that the PTAB does not choose on its 
own which cases to target: in the case of patent rejections, disappointed 
applicants choose whether to appeal, and in the case of patent issuances, 
third party petitioners may begin proceedings before PTAB.125 Yet Frakes 
and Wasserman choose, for brevity, to collapse their study of the selection 
and decisionmaking stages into a single stage.126 This Article’s theory and 
empirical results suggest that by distinguishing between patent appeals’ 
selection and decisionmaking aspects, scholars could build on their work 
to pinpoint which parts of the patent appeals process are most and least 
successful. In particular, distinguishing between the first two stages of the 
process could either reinforce or alter their recommendation that PTAB 
target lenient examiners for review. If third-party petitioners are already 
targeting lenient examiners heavily, but PTAB rarely reverses their 
decisions, then the problem would lie with PTAB’s decisionmaking rather 
than PTAB’s targeting. If, on the other hand, third-party petitioners are 
less likely to appeal the decisions of lenient examiners than applicants are 
to appeal the decisions of restrictive examiners, then the problem would 
indeed lie in the failure to select enough cases of lenient examiners for 
review.127 
In sum, the patent context illustrates the wide use of this Article’s 
theory: breaking the appeals process down into its three steps can help 
agencies determine where problems are hidden. 
B. Immigration Court 
Immigration proceedings also offer a natural comparison case for 
Social Security disability adjudications. Unlike disability hearings before 
 
123. Id. at 2420, 2433 
124. Id. at 2437-43, 2445. 
125. Id. at 2433. 
126. Id. 
127. Frakes and Wasserman actually perform different analyses for appeals of rejections 
and for appeals of issuances. For appeals of rejections, they examine whether the decisions of more 
restrictive examiners were both appealed and reversed. For challenges to issuances, they examine 
only whether the issuance received review. Although both of these analyses are valuable, neither 
distinguishes between the selection and decisionmaking stages of review. 
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ALJs, immigration court decisions are not formal adjudications under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,128 but both take place in court-like settings, 
with a judge presiding in a robe. In both systems, the claimant/immigrant 
has the right to a lawyer at his or her expense,129 though in disability 
adjudications, the possibility of benefits payments allows lawyers to work 
on contingency, making them available even to indigent claimants.130 And 
both systems include hierarchical, adversary systems of review. In fact, by 
curious coincidence, the Board of Immigration Appeals—the 
administrative appeals body for the immigration courts—and the Social 
Security Appeals Council both occupy the same nondescript office tower 
in Falls Church, Virginia. 
In previous work on immigration appeals, I took advantage of similar 
near-random assignment of cases to judges to study the effect of the 
appeals process. I found that, when the government appeals, the process 
works as expected at both the first and second stages of review, but when 
immigrants appeal, the process fails to promote uniformity at either 
stage.131 By considering each stage of review, the analysis pointed to the 
source of the problem: immigration judges not only decide whether to 
order immigrants removed but also affect whether immigrants appeal. 
They do so partly by controlling the length of immigration proceedings, 
which (in nondetained cases) routinely last years. The longer an immigrant 
has before his or her final hearing, the more likely he or she is to have a 
lawyer, and therefore to appeal an adverse decision. Harsher immigration 
judges order immigrants deported sooner in their proceedings, making 
them less likely to appeal. This dynamic prevents the appeal selection 
process from functioning correctly: since many meritorious cases never 
reach the Board of Immigration Appeals, Board review does not promote 
consistency at the second stage, either. 
Finally, developing this three-step theory of review led me to realize 
that my previous work on immigration appeals was incomplete: it only 
assessed the first two stages of review. As a result, I returned to the data to 
assess the third stage of review.132 I found that the third and last stage of 
 
128. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2018).  
129. See 42 U.S.C. 406(a) (2018) (allowing SSA to set procedures for claimant 
representation); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1) (2015) (requiring immigration judges to inform 
immigrants of this right). 
130. See 42 U.S.C. 406(b) (2018); SSA’s Fee Authorization Processes, SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/representation/overview.htm#&sb=0&a0=0 [https://perma.cc/X374-
WLLJ]. 
131. Hausman, supra note 2. Note that this analysis was limited to nondetained 
immigration court cases—those in which noncitizens were not imprisoned while fighting 
deportation. 
132. See David K. Hausman, Do Remands From the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Change Immigration Judges’ Behavior? Addendum to The Failure of Immigration Appeals 1, 
https://5a454719-8c50-4c42-b5c3-
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the immigration appeals process may work partly as expected: immigration 
judges try to avoid remands, but only very slightly. When immigration 
judges decide cases following remands in which the noncitizen won, they 
temporarily become more likely to grant relief. This effect is very small, 
even though it is three times larger for immigration judges than for Social 
Security ALJs: an additional decision after a noncitizen-initiated remand 
in a given week makes an immigration judge 1.4% more likely to allow 
noncitizens in that week to remain in the country. Conversely, when 
immigration judges decide cases after a remand following a government 
appeal, immigration judges become temporarily more likely to order a 
noncitizen removed from the country.133 
Extending the previous analysis to the third step also leads to a 
refinement of the previous policy implications. Given that remands do 
have some effect on immigration judge behavior, there is all the more 
reason to think that new review mechanisms—such as random selection of 
pro se immigration judge decisions for review by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals—would reduce disparities. But the limited size of the remand 
aversion effect also suggests that mechanisms for increasing the salience 
and cost of remands to immigration judges could be effective. 
C. Policy Implications 
Comparing disability, patent, and immigration adjudications at each 
step of the review process helps in evaluating policy responses. Table 14 
makes these comparisons and includes likely policy solutions. (Two of the 
columns reproduce Table 2 supra, and three of the columns are specific to 
the patent, immigration, Social Security contexts.) 
In patent adjudications, Frakes and Wasserman found that the 
selection and decisionmaking processes together have a consistency-
enhancing effect, but the existing evidence does not allow us to distinguish 
which is more important. As a result, it is not clear whether, to improve the 
process, the agency should work more on selection or on the 
decisionmaking of the PTAB itself. Of the three systems, the PTAB has 
the largest remand effect: the first rejection reversal issued to patent 
examiners increases their grant rate by around five percentage points.134 
But the effect is much smaller (under two percentage points) for reversals 
of patent issuances.135 
In immigration appeals, by contrast, the selection process is broken, 




133. Id. The effect of government appeals, although similar in size to that of immigrant 
appeals, is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
134. Frakes and Wasserman, supra note 117, at 2442. 
135. Id. at 2443. 
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work for immigrants who have lawyers, suggesting that universal 
government-funded representation could begin to solve the problem 
without disturbing the adversarial nature of the process. A quality 
assurance system might address these problems: with random sampling of 
cases for review, meritorious cases that are assigned to harsh, quick judges 
(and therefore are rarely appealed) would receive review. 
 





























































In Social Security disability adjudications, finally, the healthiest stage 
of the Appeals Council process is the first one, at which claimants choose 
whether to appeal. Many claimants appear to know whether the decisions 
in their cases were worth appealing. I therefore urge caution before 
replacing the appeals process with a quality assurance system; a major 
feature of such system would be random sampling of cases for review, 
eliminating claimants’ role in selection. Perhaps such sampling would still 
be useful, but these findings suggest that random selection should 
supplement, rather than replace, the current system of claimant selection. 
Of course, since the government is unrepresented and cannot request 
Appeals Council review, these findings do not suggest that the Appeals 
Council should cease random sampling of allowances. The findings do, 
however, imply that providing the government with a lawyer in ALJ 
hearings would have an advantage over random sampling: that lawyer 
could select which allowances to appeal, freeing the Appeals Council from 
relying on random sampling. 
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The decisionmaking process, by contrast, does not promote 
consistency in outcomes. The Appeals Council’s failure to promote 
uniformity, as well as its accompanying focus on errors in ALJs’ rationales 
for their decisions, does not suggest that the Appeals Council is 
unsuccessful in its mission, but rather that its mission—to standardize the 
procedures by which the ALJ conducts a hearing and articulates a rationale 
for decision—should be expanded. 
The Appeals Council may defer both too much and too little to the 
decisions of ALJs. First, on the overall assessment of the record, the level 
of deference to the ALJ’s conclusions may be too high: with such wide 
variance across ALJs in allowance rates, ALJs’ advantage over 
Administrative Appeals Judges in finding facts is open to doubt. Indeed, 
the need for agreement between two adjudicators on findings of fact may 
be one reason that peer review holds such promise. The Appeals Council 
could take a step in this direction with a weaker form of deference to the 
ALJ’s conclusions. This could be especially useful in the first stage of 
review, when analysts screen cases; with weaker deference at that stage, 
more frequent review by an Administrative Appeals Judge could reveal 
many more cases in which ALJs’ findings were not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Yet the Appeals Council’s failure to reverse the decisions of harsher 
judges more often might reflect not only too much deference to harsh 
judges’ decisions but also too little deference to generous judges’ decisions. 
Imagine a case in which the claimant clearly is not entitled to benefits, and 
the ALJ therefore gives the evidence a more cursory treatment than in a 
case that is closer to the line. Recall, for example, one frequent reason for 
remand—that the ALJ failed to identify or discuss the opinion of a 
nontreating physician. Such a failure may be more likely where the reasons 
for denial were clear, and that opinion was unlikely to affect the outcome 
of the case. Clear cases make up a higher proportion of generous ALJs’ 
denials, since they more often grant benefits. However, such cases may be 
as likely as difficult cases to lead to remands by the Appeals Council, since 
analysts screen for errors using a checklist and make no formal provision 
for harmless errors.136 
This hypothesis fits other complaints about the process. Judge David 
Hatfield has suggested in congressional testimony that the standard of 
review is not deferential enough and that the Appeals Council defers less 
to findings of fact than the substantial evidence standard would suggest it 
 
136. Cf. Eric Schnaufer, Proving Harm at the Appeals Council and on Judicial Review, 
SCHNAUFER.COM 3 (May 5, 2012), http://www.schnaufer.com/Proving-Harm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BZ4Q-JCC2] (arguing that the Appeals Council and the courts apply an implicit 
harmless-error test). 
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should. 137 Yet the requirements to which he most objects are “articulation” 
requirements: requirements that the ALJ discuss and consider each piece 
of evidence in order to reach a legally sufficient decision.138 In other words, 
the Appeals Council does not subject the ALJ’s substantive assessment of 
the evidence to de novo scrutiny but rather applies strict articulation 
requirements. As Hatfield suggests, this problem might be solved with a 
harmless error standard, or with the understanding, well accepted in the 
federal courts of appeal, that an appellate court may affirm on any ground 
that the record supports—not only on grounds that the district court 
articulated.139 
An obvious objection to this proposal is that it asks the Appeals 
Council to overstep the bounds of its current role: if the factfinding 
responsibility rests with the ALJ, the Appeals Council should not itself 
weigh the evidence. This fits a limited understanding of the Appeals 
Council’s role, in which it protects the integrity of the hearing process 
without subjecting ALJs’ conclusions to searching review. This is a role 
that the Appeals Council appears to fulfill successfully, particularly with its 
data-driven advances of the last few years.140 
Underlying this view, however, is an assumption that the ALJ is in a 
significantly better position than the Appeals Council to weigh the 
evidence. That is at least questionable—medical records, which are 
available on appeal, are the central source of evidence in most cases—and 
must be weighed against the consistency-enhancing effect of more holistic 
review. Moreover, asking the Appeals Council to consider whether it can 
affirm on the basis of other evidence in the record is asking the Council to 
grant ALJs more deference, not less. Granted, this suggestion goes hand 
in hand with the view that on larger evidentiary questions, the Council 
should defer less. Overall, however, I argue not for more or less deference, 
but rather for an approach to appellate adjudication that does substitute 
the judgment of the appeals judge for the ALJ—albeit with deference. 
The findings here offer additional reason to support some existing 
proposals for reform. For example, Michael Asimov and Jeffrey S. Wolfe 
have advocated the establishment of a Social Security Tribunal, modeled 
on a similar claims tribunal in the UK, that would increase the number of 
adjudicators who perform hearings, partly by allowing non-ALJs to 
 
137. Hearing on the Challenges of Achieving Fair and Consistent Disability Decisions: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Security of the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 113th 
Cong. 4-5 (2013) (statement of David G. Hatfield, A.L.J.). 
138. Id. at 62. 
139. See, e.g., Frederick v. Marquette Nat. Bank, 911 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e can 
affirm on any ground fairly supported by the record.”). 
140. See generally Ray & Lubbers, supra note 87. 
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conduct those hearings.141 Adjudication would take place in a tribunal 
separate from SSA,142 and although the agency would not be represented 
in hearings, it would have the power to appeal allowances, ending the 
asymmetry in appeals. If the government’s choices in appeals were similar 
to those of claimants, such a reform could harness the selection process to 
promote consistency.  The proposal would also expand the role of the 
Appeals Council (or rather its new equivalent), allowing it to take on more 
of the characteristics of an appellate court. Perhaps such a larger role 
would free the Council to look beyond the dismissals and technical errors 
that form its current focus. In sum, these suggested reforms are consistent 
with the findings of this Article: the new tribunal would expand the 
selection process for appeals, which seems to function reasonably well, and 
would offer the new Appeals Council greater freedom in its review 
decisions. The current Appeals Council’s inability to promote uniformity 
in its decisionmaking suggests that a new Appeals Council should have the 
freedom to approach the record in its cases holistically: it should 
simultaneously defer more to small evidentiary decisions and less to the 
ALJ’s assessment of the record as a whole. 
Such expanded Appeals Council review is only one possible response 
to the findings here. Another response might be to reduce the role of the 
Appeals Council. In its most extreme form, this could mean the elimination 
of the Appeals Council: claimant selection could continue to function by 
means of direct appeals to the federal district courts. Indeed, the filing fee 
and difficulty of litigating a case in federal court might heighten the sorting 
effect of the selection phase. And perhaps the district courts themselves 
would perform a holistic assessment of the record. The Appeals Council 
could persist as a policy body, issuing opinions on common legal issues and 
perhaps performing training tasks. Variations on this proposal have been 
prominent recently: Krent and Morris, in their 2013 ACUS report, 
proposed reducing the Appeals Council’s role to that of an auditor, 
reviewing a random sample of judges’ allowances and denials.143 Perhaps 
limiting the number of cases reviewed by the Appeals Council in this way 
could improve the quality of its review. Yet Gelbach and Marcus’s findings 
concerning inconsistency and inefficiency in federal-court litigation 
counsel caution.144 
 
141. Michael Asimov & Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Thinking Outside the APA Box: A New Social 
Security Tribunal, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3 (2013). 
142. Asimov and Wolfe also envision these judges occasionally sitting in panels—a form 
of peer review.   
143. KRENT & MORRIS, supra note 77, at 72-78. 
144. GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 91, at 146-67 (suggesting reforms to increase 
consistency and efficiency in federal-court decisionmaking). The results here are also consistent 
with Gelbach and Marcus’s view that remands generally fail to offer systematic, issue-based 
feedback for ALJs. Given the small and inconsistent effect of remands on ALJs’ decisionmaking 
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Finally, tweaks to the appeals selection mechanism could reduce the 
Council’s workload: the Council could, like the district courts, put in place 
a filing fee for appeals and require more extensive briefing. At present, 
there is no fee for requests for review.145 Higher barriers to appeal might 
discourage appeals in cases without merit, but they also might discourage 
appeals in meritorious cases—a problem that a generous fee waiver 
provision could address. Eliminating claimant-initiated appeals to the 
Appeals Council would in any case have a similar, but likely more severe, 
effect: the current filing fee for a civil action in federal district court is $400, 
and litigation expenses in federal court are likely to be higher than before 
the Appeals Council. 
These proposals only scratch the surface of the many possible policy 
responses; my purpose here is not to advocate specific reforms, but rather 
to indicate the directions in which the empirical analysis could point 
policymakers. 
Conclusion 
Effective discretion-limiting systems of review share three distinctive 
features. First, litigants more often appeal from the decisions of 
adjudicators who are systematically hostile to their claims. Second, those 
adjudicators’ decisions are more likely to be reversed. Third, adjudicators 
respond to remands by at least temporarily avoiding decisions that might 
lead to similar appeals. 
All three of these patterns are observable. This Article tests for their 
presence in Social Security Appeals Council review. Only the first pattern 
is clearly present: claimants appeal more often from denials by harsher 
Administrative Law Judges. In the Appeals Council decisionmaking 
process itself, harsher judges are less often reversed than their generous 
colleagues. This anomalous pattern likely follows from the types of denials 
issued by generous judges, as well as the common issues that Appeals 
Council review targets. First, dismissal decisions (mostly for failure to 
appear) make up a larger proportion of generous judges’ denials, and they 
automatically receive more extensive review. Second, Appeals Council 
analysts focus on errors in ALJs’ articulation of reasons for their decisions 
rather than on the overall degree of support in the record for an ALJ’s 
decision. In light of these results, I suggest that the Social Security 
Administration allow the Appeals Council to perform more searching 
review. 
 
and the relatively small number of remands, they appear unlikely to play this role absent a policy 
initiative to generate feedback for ALJs. 
145. See Information About Requesting Review of an Administrative Law Judge’s 
Hearing Decision, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/appeals_process.html 
[https://perma.cc/5KPC-HBBX]. 
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The method proposed here can also shed light on other areas of 
adjudication. Applying the same method in the immigration courts, the 
glaring problem is at the selection stage; immigrants without lawyers are 
unable to appeal, even when the decision exiling them comes from an 
especially harsh immigration judge. And in the patent context, work by 
other scholars reveals an asymmetry between review of rejections and 
issuances: examiners are more likely to change their behavior in response 
to reversals of rejections than to reversals of issuances. 
Empirical study of each stage of review should be a first step in policy 
change, not only for disability adjudications but for many other types of 
adjudications that share its structural features, from parking citation 
contestations to patent appeals. As data on such adjudications become 
more and more widely available, this empirical method for studying 
systems of review can and should be put to wide use. 
Appendix 
A. Case Assignment 
Assignment of cases to ALJs is formally random, but there are many 
reasons to expect violations of strict random assignment. Throughout the 
period covered by the data, SSA has had in place a rotation policy for case 
assignment: the cases follow a routine rotation through ALJs, with the 
oldest case being assigned first. The rotation is only disturbed when some 
special situation requires it, and beginning in June 2011, ALJs themselves 
no longer have any role in that reassignment.146 That change was 
accompanied by a change in the CPMS electronic database preventing 
ALJs from assigning themselves cases.  Hearing office management teams 
are responsible for case assignment but can delegate the task to lead case 
technicians and master docket clerks.147 
Violations of random assignment remained possible after that change. 
For example, a Congressional Response Report on outlier judges found 
that some ALJs within the same hearing office were assigned more “on the 
record” decisions than others—decisions without an in-person hearing.148 
Such decisions occur either when the ALJ determines that no hearing is 
necessary or the claimant waives the right to a hearing. One ALJ in the 
Congressional Response Report study reported that some ALJs in that 
hearing office preferred not to take cases to be decided without a 
hearing.149 Such cases overwhelmingly end with a favorable decision; when 
 
146. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., A-12-11-01138, 
OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WORKLOAD TRENDS 9-10 (2012). 
147. Id. at 10. 
148. Id. at 11. 
149. Id. at 11-12. 
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a favorable decision is in doubt, a hearing is usually held. The nonrandom 
assignment of these cases is therefore likely to increase disparities 
spuriously. 
Another review of Social Security case-assignment procedures found 
that over half of cases had not been assigned using the first-in-first-out 
procedure.150 More than half of these exceptions occurred in on-the-record 
decisions, some issued by Senior Attorney Adjudicators and others by 
ALJs. Still other exceptions reflected dismissals, remands, and critical 
cases (such as cases of terminal illness). 
The Congressional Response Report on outlier ALJs also 
documented more disturbing violations of random assignment of cases to 
judges.  For example, it found one ALJ for whom fifty-nine percent of 
cases involved a single claimant representative.151  The ALJ in question 
said that he heard so many cases from that representative because he 
perceived those requests as “priority” matters and because he did not 
travel to remote hearing sites.152 
Assignment may also be nonrandom when cases are reassigned from 
one ALJ to another. According to the agency’s guidelines, cases may be 
transferred after an ALJ is absent for twenty days, but the Congressional 
Response Report found that transfers often occur sooner than that. 
In sum, there is ample to reason to suspect that cases are often not 
randomly assigned to ALJs.  In order to test the assumption of random 
assignment, I perform balance tests. 
B. Balance and Sample Restrictions 
I examine balance across three characteristics of claimants that should 
be unaffected by their ALJ: their sex, their age (using a dichotomous 
variable for below or above the median age), and the type of claim they 
have brought (using a dichotomous variable that is 1 when the claimant has 
concurrent SSDI and SSI claims and 0 otherwise). To test balance across 
these characteristics, I divide up the data by office and by three-month 
period (i.e. four periods per year), further restrict the sample by including 
only judges who heard at least forty-five cases during each period 
(excluding the ten percent of judge-periods with the fewest observations), 
and exclude periods with fewer than two judges.  I then perform χ2 tests 
for independence across judges and exclude court-three-month periods in 
which at least one of the three tests (for sex, median age, and claim type) 
 
150. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., A-12-10-20169, OFFICE 
OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION AND REVIEW’S SCHEDULING PROCEDURES FOR HEARINGS 12 
(2011).   
151. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., supra note 144, at 12. 
152. Id. 
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yields a p-value below 0.1. This results in the exclusion of a little more than 
two thirds of all observations (as shown in Table 15 below). 
Further sample restrictions follow from peculiarities of the data. SSA 
provided a dataset containing records of 800,099 outcomes before the 
Appeals Council between FY2010 and FY2014. An electronic-folder 
number153 that is present in both the ALJ and Appeals Council datasets 
allows cases to be matched across the two levels of adjudication. Of the 
800,099 observations, 83,860, or about 10%, are missing this unique 
identifier; this means that they were paper-folder cases.154 These are 
unusable for this Article: they cannot be matched with original ALJ 
dispositions. Next, I exclude observations with duplicate request and 
decision dates; nearly all of these observations also share the same 
outcome, and they therefore appear to reflect unneeded duplicates in the 
system.155 Finally, I exclude all appeals after the first. This leaves 681,903 
observations, one for each unique case. Merging with the ALJ data reduces 
the number of observations by another 69,826 cases, for a simple reason: 
many of the appeals that were completed between FY 2010 and FY 2014 
had outcomes at the ALJ level from before FY 2010, and those cases are 
not present in the dataset provided by SSA. 
The ALJ dataset presents similar issues. It includes 3,828,067 
observations and 3,486,630 unique cases; when a case comes back to an 
ALJ on remand, it appears in the dataset twice. Unfortunately, 202,797 
observations are missing unique identifiers that would allow them to be 
matched with appeals or other ALJ-level observations.156 Of the remaining 
3,625,270 observations, 50,190 have duplicate filing and disposition dates; 
the large majority of these share outcomes but not claim types.  In order to 
avoid double-counting, I drop the 25,463 duplicates. Next, in order to 
concentrate on the outcome before the first appeal, I look at the last final 
disposition date before appeal.157  This eliminates hearings on remand from 
the sample, as well as hearings before the final hearing that precedes 
appeal, lowering the total number of observations to 3,465,274. Finally, 
since my interest is in judges’ behavior, I remove observations from judges 
within a single office who heard fewer than 310 cases over the five years 
under study, removing 5% of the observations.158 
 
153. This identifier is called the “efldr_num,” which the documentation provided by SSA 
calls the “system-generated unique identifier of the Electronic Folder.”  
154. Telephone Interview with Judge (Apr. 28, 2016). Such cases have become less 
common in the data over time. 
155. Of 3,388 cases with duplicate request and decision dates, 3,187 also have identical 
outcomes, so their exclusion introduces minimal bias. 
156. Unfortunately, these observations with missing identifiers are not duplicates of 
other proceedings that have such identifiers. Outcomes in cases with and without missing 
identifiers are quite similar, however, suggesting that bias from the missing data should be limited.  
157. In the very rare cases in which there are duplicate final disposition dates but 
different filing dates, I look at the later-filed case.  
158. None of the remaining offices had fewer than two judges, making cross-judge, 
within-office comparisons possible. 





Table 15: Sample Restrictions 
 
Appeals Council Data 
 
Full dataset 800,099 
Remove observations without unique IDs 716,239 
Remove duplicate request and appeal dates 712,851 




Full dataset 3,828,067 
Remove observations without unique IDs 3,625,270 
Remove cases with duplicate request and 
appeal dates 
3,599,807 
Keep the final hearing before appeal, 
eliminating earlier hearings before and 
hearings on remand after appeal 
3,465,274 
Remove judge/office pairs with fewer than 310 
hearings 
3,292,134 
Remove judge-court-three-month-period pairs 
with fewer than 49 cases 
2,995,406 
Remove periods with just one judge 2,979,667 
Remove periods with evidence of nonrandom 
assignment 
1,085,699 
Remove cases with ALJ dispositions after 2012 663,901 
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C. Selection and Decisionmaking Regressions 
To estimate the effect of ALJs’ allowance rates on (1) whether 
claimants appeal, (2) whether their appeals reach an Administrative 
Appeals Judge, (3) whether their appeals receive review by two 
Administrative Appeals Judges and (4) and whether their appeals are 
remanded, I use a linear probability model in which only the dependent 
variable and the sample vary. That model has the form: 
 
Yijct= ß0 + ß1Xijct + ß2Jjc + ß3Rijct + ß4(Rijct*Jjc)  + ß5Gjc + Γct + eijct 
 
where Yijct is the dichotomous dependent variable (appeal, AAJ decision, 
review, or remand) for case i before ALJ j in hearing office c in year t, Xict 
is a vector of control variables that includes sex and date of birth, J is each 
ALJ’s demeaned allowance rate within a given hearing office, R is an 
indicator variable for whether a claimant has a legal representative, and G 
is each ALJ’s demeaned dismissal rate (among denials—note that this 
variable is only included in the dismissals-related results above). 
D. Remand Regressions 
To test whether remands affect short-term ALJ behavior, I use a 
panel regression model of the form: 
 
Yijt= ß0 + ß1Xijt + ß2Jjt + ß3Djt + Γjt + eijt 
 
where  Yijt  is a binary outcome for disability case i before ALJ j in time 
period t, where J is the number of remands for judge j in time period t, D 
is the total number of cases completed by judge j in time period t, X is a 
vector of control variables (age and sex), and 𝛤 represents fixed effects for 
judges and time periods. A weakness of the analysis, especially compared 
to the analogous findings in immigration court, is the inability to consider 
remands after own motion review by the Appeals Council. Unfortunately, 
I am unable to identify such remands reliably in the data.159 That means 
that both types of remands are included in the monthly total for judges. 
Remands after requests for review overwhelmingly outnumber own 
motion remands, so the bias created by this inclusion should be small. 
Nonetheless, I suggest more caution in interpreting these findings than in 
interpreting the findings at the first two stages of appeal. 
Since the panel regressions do not rely on the assumption of random 
case assignment to judges, I use the full dataset, removing judges with 
 
159. See supra text accompanying note 74 
Reviewing Administrative Review 
1121 
relatively few cases and remands, and excluding cases decided without a 
hearing. Table 16 shows sample restrictions. 
For the ALJ remand analysis, I also employ two other models. In the 
first of those specifications, I run the same regression as above, but I make 
J an indicator variable for whether an ALJ held a hearing on remand in the 
last week, the last two weeks, the last month, or the last two months before 
each hearing. For these regressions, time period t corresponds to months. 
Results are in Table 17 below; they show the same pattern as the 
regressions presented in the text above. 
In the second of those specifications, I make J an indicator variable 
for whether the Appeals Council issued a remand for a case from that ALJ 
in last week, the last two weeks, the last month, or the last two months 
before each hearing. Again, time period t corresponds to months. 
Comparing these two sets of results, the remand hearing date results 
show not only the expected direction, but also the expected pattern, with 
the effect decreasing as the hearing becomes more distant. By contrast, the 
remand-date results become stronger as the time period grows longer—a 
strange pattern. Overall, since ALJs are more likely to become aware of 
remands when they hold hearings on them, I am inclined to credit the 
results in the main text and Table 17 over those in Table 18, but my 
confidence in both is low. 
 
Table 16: Sample Restrictions for ALJ Remand Analysis 
 
Full dataset 3,828,067 
Remove observations without unique IDs 3,625,270 
Remove cases with duplicate request and 
appeal dates 
3,599,807 
Remove judge/office pairs with fewer than 310 
hearings 
3,426,989 
Drop duplicate records after remand 3,426,935 
Remove judges with fewer than 14 remands 3,256303 
Remove cases decided without hearing, since 
the timing of the decision in those cases is more 
difficult to pinpoint 
2,656,559 
Exclude remands themselves 2,576,342 
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Table 17: Chance of Benefits Grant by Time Since Last Remand 
Hearing 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant wins 
 














































N 2,572,571 2,572,571 2,572,571 2,572,571 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include month and office-ALJ fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on office-ALJ 
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Table 18: Chance of Benefits Grant by Time Since Last Appeals 
Council Remand Decision 
 
Dependent variable is 1 if claimant wins 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









































N 2,572,571 2,572,571 2,572,571 2,572,571 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Models include month and office-ALJ fixed effects 
Standard errors clustered on office-ALJ 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
